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1. Introduction 
 
In this paper, we aim to outline some ambiguities of the so-called 2003 regulatory framework 
for electronic communications. We analyse ambiguities with regard its objectives as well as 
its institutional design (in particular the role of the European Commission), and try to propose 
some ways forward to alleviate that its implementation ends up increasing the regulatory 
costs. 
 
In Section 2, we briefly set the stage and place the 2003 Framework in the context of the 
European policy for Information and Communications Technologies. In Section 3, we focus 
on the ambiguities in the objectives of the new directives. They provide for general regulatory 
principles and broad policy objectives, and otherwise use open norms leaving much discretion 
to the regulatory actors. We submit that this broad discretion given by the ‘substantive law’ is 
only partially counterbalanced by institutional mechanisms to guarantee regulatory 
forbearance and harmonisation across Member States. Thus, there may be a risk of over-
regulation, inconsistent regulation, and ultimately legal uncertainty. In Section 4, we focus on 
a particular aspect of the institutional design of the new directives and analyse the ambiguous 
role of the Commission. It should control national regulators to ensure that they fulfil the 
objectives of the directives, and at the same time should be a catalyst of consensus among the 
very same regulators. We submit that this dual and possibly contradictory role of the 
Commission may undermine its duty in ensuring common regulatory approaches across 
Europe and a single market for electronic communications. Finally in Section 5, we conclude 
by sketching out possible solutions to address these ambiguities and alleviate inefficient 
regulation. 
 
 
 
2. Setting the stage: the European policy for the ICT sector 
 
The European ICT policy aims to foster investment and innovation in the sector. This 
objective is justified for macro-economic reasons as a consensus emerges among economists 
that the development of ICT is one of the main drivers for the increase of productivity and the 
growth of the GDP1. This objective is also justified on social grounds, in order to alleviate an 
                                                 
* European Commission, DG Competition, Brussels and European University Institute, Florence. The opinions 
expressed are purely personal and do in any case not reflect those of the European Commission. This paper states 
the law as of 1 June 2004, unless indicated otherwise. Thanks for their helpful comments: Yves Blondeel, 
Philippe Defraigne, Daniel Muether, Robert Queck Jean-Paul Simon, and the participants of the Third 
Conference of the Round Table Expert Group on Telecommunications organised by the IViR in December 2003. 
1 D.W. Jorgenson, Information Technology and the G7 Economies, Working Paper, Harvard University, October 
2003. E. Liikanen, Accelerating the Renewal of Europe’s Economy and Society with ICT, Speech 28.11.2003. 
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unacceptable digital divide between the ‘information haves’ and the ‘information haves not’2. 
This European policy is based on a combination of three interlinked pillars3.  
 
The first pillar is the eEurope 2005 Action plan endorsed at the 2002 Seville European 
Council4. It sets very ambitious objectives for European electronic communications and relies 
on the Open Method of Co-ordination to achieve them. This method involves four steps5: 
 
(1) Fixing guidelines for the Union combined with specific timetables for achieving the goals 
that they set in the short, medium and long terms. Thus, the Action Plan provides that by 
2005, Europe should have high speed secure Internet infrastructure and attractive contents, 
services and applications. It focuses on the demand-side by encouraging the provision of 
modern on-line public services (e-government, e-learning, e-health) and a dynamic e-
business environment. But the Plan also concentrates on the supply-side by stimulating a 
widespread availability of broadband and secure infrastructures. 
(2) Establishing, where appropriate, quantitative and qualitative indicators and benchmarks 
against the best in the world and tailored to the needs of different Member Sates and 
sectors as a means of comparing best practice. Thus, the Commission6 designed a set of 
indicators related to the Internet (access by the citizens and the enterprises, and its costs), 
to the on-line public services and the e-business activity (buying and selling on-line, e-
business readiness), to the network’s security (users’ experiences regarding security) and 
the broadband penetration. 
(3) Translating these European guidelines into national and regional policies by setting 
specific targets and adopting measures, taking into account national and regional 
differences. Thus, each Member State has to adopt a national strategy regarding for 
instance broadband deployment or digital switchover7. These strategies should abide EU 
law, and in particular the rules on state aids and structural funds8. 
(4) Periodic monitoring, evaluation and peer review organised as mutual learning processes. 
Thus the Commission publishes reports of the progress of the indicators and has just 
conducted a mid-term review of the Action Plan9.  
 
The second pillar of the European ICT policy is the recently adopted regulatory framework 
for electronic communications. It aims to provide certainty to investors, increase competition 
and consumers’ choice and stimulate innovation to the benefit of the European consumers. In 
                                                 
2 The digital divide is also addressed at the UN level, for instance at World Summit on Information Society: 
<http://www.itu.int/wsis/index.html>. See: Communication from the Commission of 17 February 2004, Towards 
a Global Partnership in the Information Society: Follow-up of the Geneva Summit of the World Summit on 
Information Society, COM(2004) 111. 
3 E. Liikanen, EU Policies to boost Productivity through ICT investments, Speech 21.11.2003. Communication 
from the Commission of 3 February 2004, Connecting Europe at high speed: recent developments in the sector 
of electronic communications, COM(2004) 61. 
4 Communication from the Commission of 28 May 2002, eEurope 2005: An information society for all, 
COM(2002) 263. 
5 Para 37 of the Presidency Conclusions of the Lisbon European Council, March 2000. 
6 Communication from the Commission of 21 November 2002, eEurope 2005: Benchmarking Indicators, 
COM(2002) 655. 
7 Communication from the Commission of 12 May 2004, Connecting Europe at High Speed: National 
Broadband Strategies, COM(2004) 369. 
8 See Commission Services Guidelines of 28 July 2003 on criteria and modalities of implementation of the 
Structural Funds in support of electronic communications, SEC (2003) 89. 
9 Communication from the Commission of 18 February 2004, eEurope 2005 Mid-term Review, COM(2004) 
108; Communication from the Commission of 17 May 2004, eEurope 2005 Action Plan: An Update, 
COM(2004) 380. 
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practice and carrying forward the philosophy of the previous framework -the so-called 1998 
package- the new directives places a strong confidence in market mechanisms to maximise 
consumers’ welfare. The framework is made of a liberalisation directive10 adopted by the 
Commission in September 2002, that recalls and specifies the principles of market 
liberalisation and freedom to provide services which were at the core of the 1998 full 
liberalisation of telecommunications markets. It is also composed of four harmonisation 
directives11 adopted by the European Parliament and the Council in March 2002 (and whose 
national transposition measures were due to be applicable in July 2003). The Framework 
Directive comprises provisions related to the institutions and their co-ordination to ensure an 
European regulatory culture, to the assessment of Significant Market Power (which is the 
threshold to impose the majority of regulatory obligations), and to the facilities needed to 
operate in a telecom market (such as numbering, naming and addressing, rights of way). The 
Authorisation Directive organises market entry and rolls back any unnecessary red tape. The 
Access Directive organises the wholesale markets (i.e. relationships between providers of 
electronic communications networks and services) and aims at ensuring a true single and 
effectively competitive market. The Universal Service Directive organises the retail markets 
(i.e. relationships between operators and end-users) and aims at ensuring the best possible 
deal for the European citizens. In addition, the regulatory framework is made of a Spectrum 
decision and an e-privacy directive12. 
 
The third pillar of the European ICT policy consists of supporting research and development 
preparing the future and ensuring Europe’s mastering of the key elements of the ICT 
technology and value chain. It consists of the part the Sixth Research Framework Program 
devoted to Information Society Technologies (IST, more than 4 billion Euro for the period 
2002-2006)13. In particular14, it focuses on (1) applied research addressing major societal and 
economic challenges (security, eHealth, eGovernment, eBusiness, …); (2) communication, 
computing and software technologies (broadband development, wireless systems beyond 3G, 
open development platforms); (3) components and micro-systems (micro and nano systems, 
opto-electronics), (4) knowledge and interface technologies (multi-modal interfaces, cognitive 
systems); and (5) future and emerging technologies. 
 
                                                 
10 Commission Directive 2002/77/EC of 16 September 2002 on competition in the markets for electronic 
communications networks and services, O.J. [2002] L 249/21. 
11 Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a common 
regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services (Framework Directive), O.J. [2002] 
L 108/33; Directive 2002/20/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on the 
authorisation of electronic communications networks and services (Authorisation Directive), O.J. [2002] L 
108/21; Directive 2002/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on access to, and 
interconnection of, electronic communications networks and services (Access Directive), O.J. [2002] L 108/7; 
Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on universal service and 
users' rights relating to electronic communications networks and services (Universal Service Directive), O.J. 
[2002] L 108/51.  
12 Decision 676/2002/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a regulatory 
framework for radio spectrum policy in the European Union (Radio Spectrum Decision), O.J. [2002] L 108/1; 
Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing 
of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and 
electronic communications), O.J. [2002] L 201/37 
13 Decision 1513/2002/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 June 2002 concerning the sixth 
framework programme of the European Community for research, technological development and demonstration 
activities, contributing to the creation of the European Research Area and to innovation (2002 to 2006), O.J. 
[2002] L 232/1. 
14 See: <http://www.cordis.lu/ist/>. 
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3. Ambiguities in the objectives of the 2003 Framework15 
 
The 1998 regulatory package16 was the last piece of the liberalisation program aimed to foster 
the emergence of a single EU telecommunications market securing the necessary critical mass 
for a dynamic European telecommunications sector, thus improving the competitiveness of 
the European economy in an increasingly globalised world17. The directives were designed for 
a relatively simple market structure and had clear goals that have been instrumentalised in 
easily observable indicators (as listed in Annex I of this paper). The package aimed to remove 
any special and exclusive right, as well as actively promote entry in the markets by regulating 
the previous monopolists and supporting new operators. They provided for a single date for 
the full opening of the markets in all the Member States (1 January 1998 with a few controlled 
exceptions), in order to avoid reciprocity objections of operators from countries that would 
have delayed liberalisation. The directives also provided for safeguards to ensure that the 
liberalisation would not happen at the expense of the weak categories of the society. To 
achieve all these objectives, the 1998 package was based on the practice and experience in a 
number of Member States that had liberalised their markets before its adoption, such as the 
UK and Sweden. 
 
The new directives are designed for a much more complex market structure, with 
technologies converging at an unpredictable pace, markets being more or less competitive 
depending of the country or the segment in the value chain, and ultimately an increasing 
difficulty to determine which actors and activities to regulate, since the dominant position of 
the relevant actors does no more always result from former monopoly rights. Moreover, the 
new framework is not only based on the practice and experience of the NRAs with the 
previous framework, but also on now fashionable good governance principles and economic 
theory, discussed in the framework of the 1999 Review. As a consequence, the 2003 
framework does not provide a clear regulatory vision (and its underlying market design). On 
the contrary, the directives provide on the one hand overarching regulatory principles and 
broad policy objectives, and on the other hand, leave a broad margin of discretion to the 
regulatory actors when addressing in detail each branch of the regulation (entry, economic, 
and social regulation). It is thus only when looking at the accompanying soft-law instruments 
(like Guidelines or Recommendations of the Commission, or Common Position or Principles 
of Implementation and Best Practices of the NRAs) that we find a more precise (although 
often vague) vision. Finally, the directives provide for an ‘institutional design’ whose 
safeguards may be insufficient to compensate the important discretion of the regulatory actors 
and ensure the principles of forbearance and of harmonisation 
 
                                                 
15 On the 2003 Framework, see: A. Bavasso, Communications in EU Antitrust Law: Market Power and Public 
Interest, Kluwer, 2003; S. Farr and V. Oakley, EU Communications Law, Palladian Law, 2002; L. Garzaniti, 
Telecommunications, Broadcasting and the Internet: EU Competition Law and Regulation, 2nd ed, Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2003; C. Koenig, A. Bartosh and D. Braun (eds), EU Competition and Telecommunications Law, 
Kluwer, 2002; W. Maxwell (ed), Electronic Communications: The New EU Framework, Oceana Publications, 
2002; P. Nihoul and P. Rodford, EU Electronic Communications Law: Competition and Regulation in the 
European Telecommunications Markets, O.U.P., 2004. 
16 On the 1998 package, see: M. Cave and L. Prosperetti, "European Telecommunications Infrastructures", 
Oxford Review of Economic Policy 4, 2001; P. Larouche, Competition Law and Regulation in European 
Telecommunications, Hart, 2000; J. Scherer (ed), Telecommunications in Europe, 4th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 
1998; I. Walden & J. Angel (eds), Telecommunications Law, Blackstone Press, 2001. 
17 Communication of the Commission of 30 June 1987, Towards a Dynamic European Economy: Green Paper 
on the Development of the Common Market for Telecommunications Services and Equipment, COM(87) 290. 
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3.1. Regulatory principles and policy objectives 
 
Thus, the Commission decided to ground its proposals on five good regulatory principles18. 
(1) Regulation should be based on clearly defined political objectives. (2) Regulation should 
be limited to what is necessary to meet those objectives, removing the obligations of the 1998 
package which are no longer necessary. (3) Regulation should ensure legal certainty allowing 
companies to make investment decisions with confidence, but be flexible enough to respond 
to dynamic and unpredictable market developments. That implies a sort of “re-
nationalisation” of the common regulation of the dominant operators to allow each NRA to 
impose obligations on the market players on its territory according to national circumstances 
instead of having these obligations set in EU Directives. (4) Regulation should be 
technologically neutral to take the convergence into account. (5) Regulation should be 
enforced as closely as practicable to activities being regulated, whether regulation has been 
agreed globally, regionally or nationally. 
 
According to the first principle, the Framework Directive19 provides for three broad policy 
objectives to be followed by the NRAs: (1) sustaining an open and competitive European 
market for communications services in order to provide a better deal for the consumer; (2) 
consolidating the internal market; and (3) benefiting the European citizen by ensuring 
affordable access to universal service and ensuring a high level of data protection and privacy. 
These objectives remain very general and look more like a catalogue than a coherent 
statement. For instance, NRAs ‘shall promote competition’ by ‘ensuring that users ... derive 
maximum benefits in terms of choice, price and quality’, ‘ensuring that there is no distortion 
or restriction of competition’ and also ‘encouraging efficient investment and promoting 
innovation’. These various goals, as we saw under the 1998 package, are not necessarily 
compatible so that the new directives leaves the door open to a continuation of the current 
policy contradictions20 between the approaches of the various European Ministries and NRAs, 
and do, in principle, not prevent further divergences as regards the obligations (“remedies”) 
imposed  on SMP operators.  
 
 
3.2. The ‘substantive law’ and its use of open norms 
 
(a) Entry on the market 
 
With regard to entry on the market, the directives aim to get rid of any unnecessary red tape to 
enter the market that the 1998 package was not able to avoid. Thus, they ensure that the 
general authorisation is the rule, and their conditions are limited to the list provided in the 
Annex A of the Authorisation directive21. For the scarce resources (like numbering and 
frequencies), they allow Member States to grant individual rights of use in addition of the 
                                                 
18 Communication of the Commission of 10 November 1999, Towards a new framework for Electronic 
Communications infrastructures and associated services – The 1999 Communications Review COM(1999) 623, 
pp. 14-17. For an analysis of the application of these principles in the directives: A. de Streel et R. Queck, “Un 
nouveau cadre réglementaire pour les communications électroniques en Europe”, Journal des tribunaux de droit 
européen, 2003, 193-202. 
19 Article 8 of the Framework Directive. 
20 P. Larouche, “What went wrong: the European perspective”, in Report of the Second Conference of the Round 
Table Expert Group on Telecommunications Law, April 2003, p. 76. 
21 Articles 3, 4, 6, 9 to 12 and Annex, part A of the Authorisation Directive. 
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general authorisation when justified and given in a transparent and non-discriminatory way 
but limit the conditions that may be imposed on operators22. 
 
These rules are undoubtedly a big step forward, but are still insufficient to ensure a single and 
competitive electronic communications market at least in two respects. First with regard to the 
management of frequencies which have been identified by many as one of the main failures of 
the 1998 package and a possible cause of the over-indebtedness of telecom operators and the 
reluctance of the financial markets to further invest in the sector23, the framework sets the 
basis for a co-ordinated policy across Europe (for instance allocation of radio spectrum, 
possibilities and conditions of secondary trading,…) but without forcing Member States to 
agree or granting the Commission specific powers beyond recommending common 
approaches. That may be not be enough to alleviate another 3G-licence tragedy and ensure the 
emergence of new technologies and applications (like Wi-Fi, WiMax 802.16, ...). Second with 
regard to the granting of rights of way, the new directives guarantee that they will be allocated 
under proportionate and non-discriminatory conditions, but do not manage to limit the type of 
conditions that may be imposed on the operators24. 
 
 
(b) Economic Regulation of market activities (1): The SMP regime 
 
With regard to the regulation of economic activities to ensure efficiency, the directives set 
only very general criteria to decide when NRAs should intervene. That may be illustrated with 
the two main aspects of economic regulation: the SMP regime which constitute the main part 
of it, and the standardisation regime. 
 
In SMP regime25, regulatory obligations are imposed in three steps. (1) In the first step, 
markets to be analysed are defined in two sequences. The Commission periodically adopts a 
Recommendation26 that defines, in accordance with the principles of competition law, the 
product and service markets within the electronic communications sector, the characteristics 
of which may be such as to justify the imposition of regulatory obligations. In practice, the 
Commission has to select the markets justifying ex ante regulation because of their structural 
                                                 
22 Articles 5 to 8, 10, 13, 13 and Annex, parts B and C of the Authorisation Directive. 
23 P. Larouche, cited at note 20; H. Ungerer, What are the results of 15 years deregulation in 
Telecommunications, What are the challenges and opportunities for telecommunications and media operators 
and policy makers in the coming years?, Speech 23.1.2003, p. 6. 
24 In other words, there is no Part D in the Annex of the Authorisation Directive that would list the conditions 
that may be attached when granting rights of way, as there is a list for the conditions attached to the general 
authorisation (Part A), to the rights of use of radio frequencies (Part B), and to the rights of use for number (Part 
C). 
25 Articles 14 to 16 of the Framework Directive. A.F. Bavasso, “Electronic communications: a new paradigm for 
European regulation”, Common Market Law Review 41(1), 2004, 87-118; M. Bak, “European electronic 
communications on the road to full competition: The concept of Significant Market Power under the new 
regulatory framework”, Journal of Network Industries 4, 2003; M. Cave, “Economic Aspects of the New 
Regulatory Regime for Electronic Communication Services”, in P. Buiges and P. Rey (eds), The Economics of 
Antitrust and Regulation in Telecommunications, E. Elgar, 2004, 27-41; A. de Streel, “The Integration of 
Competition Law Principles in the New European Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications”, 
World Competition 26, 2003, 489-514. 
26 Commission Recommendation of 11 February 2003 on relevant product and service markets within the 
electronic communications sector susceptible to ex ante regulation in accordance with Directive 2002/21/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications 
networks and services, OJ [2003] L 114/45, hereinafter Recommendation on relevant markets. See: A. de Streel, 
“Market Definitions in the New European Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications”, Info 5, 2003, 
27-47. 
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problems and then, delineate the boundaries of these markets on the basis of antitrust 
methodologies. Taking account of this Recommendation on relevant markets and the 
Commission Guidelines on market analysis27, the NRA then defines markets appropriate to 
national circumstances, in particular their geographical dimension within its territory, in 
accordance with the principles of competition law. (2) In the second step, the NRA analyses 
the defined markets to determine whether one or more operators enjoy SMP, which amounts 
to determine whether one or more undertakings enjoy a dominant position (as defined under 
European competition law) or could leverage a dominant position from a closely related 
market28. (3) In the third step, if operators have been designated as having SMP, the NRA 
imposes on them the appropriate specific regulatory obligations to be chosen from a menu 
provided in the directives They should choose remedies that are appropriate, justified and 
proportionate according to the Common Position on remedies recently adopted by the 
European regulators29. Conversely, if none operator enjoy SMP, the NRA must withdraw any 
obligation that may be in place and shall not impose or maintain any new one. Thus the 
regime build in a market-by-market sunset clause. 
 
As we detail later, the role of the Commission is important as it steers the whole process. It 
starts the procedure by adopting and updating the Recommendation on relevant markets. 
More importantly, the Commission may review under the so-called Article 7 review30 all the 
NRAs decisions that would affect trade between Member States. It can veto a product and 
service market definition that differs from those of the Recommendation and an SMP (or a 
non SMP) designation. It can also give a non-binding opinion on the choice of regulatory 
obligations. 
 
However, this three-steps process leaves a number of uncertainties as regards its future 
application. The first sequence of the first step (i.e. selection of markets to be regulated 
because of their structural problems) may for example be controversial. The Framework 
Directive provides, in a very sibylline way, that SMP obligations are to be imposed only 
where there is market power that can not be efficiently controlled by antitrust law. It adds that 
new and emerging markets, in which market power may be found to exist because of ‘first 
mover’ advantages, should not in principle be selected31. This selection shows that the 
rationale justifying economic regulation has been radically revised. Under the 1998 package, 
the SMP regime was mainly related to the competitive conditions under which infrastructures 
have been deployed. It mainly applied to markets previously under legal monopoly (fixed 
voice networks and services and leased lines32) and was thus linked to the original sin of the 
previous monopolist. Under the new directives, the SMP regulation is dis-connected from the 
original sin, and is linked to the inefficiency of antitrust to control market power. 
 
                                                 
27 Commission Guidelines on market analysis and the assessment of significant market power under the 
Community regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services, OJ [2002], C 165/6, 
hereinafter Guidelines on market analysis. 
28 See Guidelines on market analysis, para 70-106; ERG Working Paper of May 2003 on the SMP concept for 
the new regulatory framework, ERG(03) 09rev2. 
29 ERG Common Position of 1 April 2004 on the approach to appropriate remedies in the new regulatory 
framework, ERG(03) 30rev1, hereinafter Common Position on remedies. See R.A. Cawley, “The new approach 
to economic regulation in the electronic communications sector in Europe: the application of regulatory 
remedies”, Journal of Network Industries 5, 2004. 
30 By reference to the Article 7 of the Framework Directive. 
31 Article 15(1) and Recital 27 of the Framework Directive. 
32 There was nevertheless a slight possibility to regulate the mobile sector, that has been used more and more 
over time by the regulators across Europe: Article 7(2) of the Interconnection Directive 97/33. 
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However the efficiency of antitrust is an untested criterion that may be difficult to apply. 
Indeed different interpretations (that are not necessarily contradictory) have already been 
proposed. For the Commission33, three criteria must be cumulatively fulfilled: high and non-
transitory entry barriers, market structures that do not lead to effective competition behind the 
barriers, and relative inefficiency of antitrust remedies to solve the market failure (because 
compliance requirement are extensive, frequent and/or timely intervention is indispensable, or 
legal certainty is of paramount concern). For one of us34, this means that regulation is justified 
in case of natural monopoly, externalities, or market structure leading to tacit collusion. 
Before the adoption of the directives, Larouche35 proposed to focus regulation on cases of 
bottlenecks or network effects. For some external consultants of the Commission, market 
failures that may currently justify ex ante regulation: interconnection (especially termination 
practices), access to networks or digital gateways, local loop, distributions and access to 
scarce resources. For the future, they identified also: intellectual property rights, directory 
services, programming guides, control over interfaces/web navigators36. 
 
In addition, the third step of the process (i.e. imposition of appropriate remedies) is also 
difficult as the directives provides for a broad list of remedies to be imposed on the wholesale 
markets (mainly transparency, non-discrimination, accounting separation, third-party access, 
and price control) and the retail markets37. They only instruct the NRAs to follow three high 
level principles: remedies should be based on the identified problem, justified with regard to 
the objectives of the NRAs, and proportionate38. In addition, the ERG committed to a fourth 
principle: that remedies should be incentive compatible, i.e. formulated in such way that the 
advantages to the regulated party of compliance outweigh the benefits of evasion39. 
 
However, these principles leave room for much interpretation. For instance, a classical debate 
is to determine if regulation should promote infrastructure (facilities-based) competition or 
services (access-based) competition. For Commissioner Monti40, there is no conflict between 
both types of competition when the time dimension is taken into account. Indeed, NRAs 
should provide incentives for competitors to seek access from the incumbents in the shorter 
term, and to rely increasingly more on building their own infrastructure in the longer term. It 
remains that the balance between short-term and long-term considerations is very delicate to 
set, and the debate may be reframed between NRAs favouring long-term considerations and 
NRAs favouring short term needs. 
 
The directives41 do not provide any clear indication to decide between the different positions 
among the European regulators42. It may be argued that the accompanying soft-law 
                                                 
33 Recitals 9 to 16 of the Commission Recommendation on relevant markets. See the background study done for 
the Commission services: Squire-Sanders-Dempsey and WIK Consult, Market Definitions for Regulatory 
Obligations in Communications Markets, 2002. 
34 A. de Streel, cited at note 25, 496. 
35 Cited at note 16, 368-398. 
36 Squire-Sanders-Dempsey and Analysis, Consumer demand for telecommunications services and the 
implications of the convergence of fixed and mobile networks for the regulatory framework for a liberalised EU 
market, 1999, 147. 
37 Respectively Articles 9 to 13 of the Access Directive and Article 17 Universal Service Directive. 
38 Article 8(4) of the Access Directive and Article 17(2) of the Universal Service Directive. 
39 Common Position on remedies, 71-73. 
40 M. Monti, Remarks at the European Regulators Group Hearing on Remedies, Speech 26.01.2004, 3. 
41 In particular Article 12 of the Access Directive. 
42 T. Kiessling and Y. Blondeel, “The impact of Regulation on Facility-Based Competition in 
Telecommunications: A Comparative Analysis of Recent Developments in North America and the European 
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instruments are tilting the balance in favour of infrastructure competition, but that is not 
definitive. The Recommendation on relevant markets notes that43: “The aim of the new 
regulatory framework is ultimately to achieve a situation where there is full infrastructure 
competition between a number of different infrastructures. This can occur within or between 
platforms. Regulation mandating access to existing networks serves as a transitional measure 
to ensure services competition and consumer choice until such a time as sufficient 
infrastructural competition exists”. The Common Position on remedies notes that: “Where 
replication of the infrastructure is known to be feasible, remedies should assist in the 
transition process to a sustainable market and assist the new entrants in climbing the ‘ladder 
of investment’. Where infrastructure competition is not likely feasible, NRAs must ensure 
sufficient access to wholesale inputs in order to secure maximum consumers benefits”. Thus, 
the regulatory actors agree that regulation should aim to promote infrastructure competition 
where possible (and that access price should safeguard investment incentives44) because it is 
the only competition that is self-sustaining and may lead to a complete removal of regulation. 
Services competition should only be relied upon when facilities-based competition is not 
possible or as a transitory step towards facilities-based competition. However, it is not clear 
when infrastructure competition is possible and when services competition may be a 
transitory step, in particular in a sector with a long and rapidly evolving value chain. Thus, the 
hard-law as well as the soft-law leave much discretion to the NRAs to pursue their own 
regulatory strategies. 
 
A related issue is to determine if and how sector regulation should promote entry. In 
particular, should regulation only favour entry of operators that are equally efficient than the 
incumbent or also entry of operators that are less efficient than the incumbent? This is all the 
more complicated because the relative efficiency of a new entrant is difficult to assess due to 
the prevalent economies of scale and scope in the sector45. Should the efficiency of a new 
entrant be assessed as if they were enjoying the same economies of scale and scope than the 
incumbent (which will rarely be the case in reality), or should it be assessed without such 
economies (which will often lead to the conclusion that the new entrant is less efficient)? 
 
Again, the directives are fairly silent on the issue. The alignment of the SMP concept with 
antitrust principles may suggest that the regime is now limited to favour entry of equally 
efficient firms. Indeed, the role of antitrust is to protect competition and not competitors46, 
                                                                                                                                                        
Union”, Communications & Strategies, 1999, 36; T. Kiessling and Y. Blondeel, “Effective competition in 
European telecommunications: an analysis of recent regulatory developments”, Info 1, 1999, 419-439. 
43 Explanatory Memorandum, p. 25. This was the justification for not including resale products. However during 
its market analysis, Oftel has selected and regulated pure resale products (wholesale access lines), and the 
Commission did not raise any comments regarding the proportionality of this remedy (Commission decision of 
23 September 2003, UK/2003/11 to UK/2003/16). The issue is nevertheless also the time-horizon of the relevant 
remedies as reflected in the statement of M. Monti (idem note 40) that: ‘in the longer term, the regulatory 
framework should privilege operators which base their competitive advantage on building their own 
infrastructure”. 
44 On the relationship between access prices and infrastructure investment, see the papers in  
Telecommunications Policy 27, 2003, 657-727 (special issue edited by M. Cave). These papers suggest an access 
price positively related to the replicability of the asset, and rising over time. This scheme aims to ensure static as 
well as dynamic efficiency. This sort of rising access price over time has been adopted by the Dutch NRA since 
1998.  
45 See the discussion in the Annex of the Common Position on remedies. 
46 E.M. Fox, “We Protect Competition, You Protect Competitors”, World Competition 26, 2003, 149-165. 
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and an alignment in methodologies may imply an alignment in objectives47. However, this 
rationale may not hold for at least two reasons. First, the role of antitrust in newly liberalised 
sectors where effective competition seems possible in the future may be different than in 
normal industries48. In these particular sectors, there may be a case for antitrust to actively 
promote entry of less efficient firms because it may pay in the long run to have many actors 
competing with each other49. Second, an alignment of methodologies does not necessarily 
imply an alignment of objectives. Antitrust methodologies may just be seen as a rigorous 
economic way to look at the market and read the forces at play, independently of the 
objectives of the authority relying on these methodologies. Again, any more precise indication 
should be looked for in the soft-law instruments, but they do not provide an explicit answer. 
For instance, the Common Position on remedies contains certain indication that regulators 
may promote less efficient entry in some cases, but that is not definitive50.  
 
These uncertainties may lead to very different regulatory strategies across Europe, all of them 
being compatible with European law because the 2003 Framework does not prioritise between 
the objectives that NRAs should bear in mind when intervening. For instance, to deal with the 
pervasive domination of the incumbents in the local loop, a national regulator may be very 
interventionist. It may impose access obligation at several points of the incumbent’s network 
(full unbundling, shared access, bitstream, simple and double transit interconnection) or even 
resale offers, and choose pricing methodologies leading to the lowest access price providing a 
reasonable rate of return51. Conversely, a national regulator may be less interventionist. It may 
limit compulsory access (by excluding bitstream in some densely populated region) or not 
imposing wholesale offers, and/or implement pricing methodology leading to higher access 
prices. 
 
 
(c) Economic Regulation of market activities (2): Standardisation 
 
Another example where the new directives do not contain a binding regulatory strategy relates 
to the standardisation regime and the much-debated open source issue52. The Framework 
Directive provides that standards should not be regulated in principle, but that the 
Commission may impose specific standards where necessary to ensure interoperability of 
services and improve freedom of choices for users53. The most controversial issue relates to 
                                                 
47 M. Monti, Competition and Regulation in the new Framework, Speech of 15.7.2003; R. Kruger and L. Di 
Mauro, “The Article 7 mechanism: managing the consolidation of the internal market for electronic 
communications”, Competition Policy Newsletter 2003/3, p. 36. 
48 Larouche, cited note 16; L. Hancher and J.L. Buendia Serra, “Cross-Subsidization and EC Law”, Common 
Market Law Review, 1998, 901-941; M. Motta and A. de Streel, “Exploitative and exclusionary excessive 
pricing in EU law”, in C.D. Ehlermann and I. Atanasiu (eds), Competition Law Annual 2003: What is an Abuse 
of Dominant Position, Hart, 2004. 
49 Conseil de la Concurrence français, “Etudes thématiques: L’orientation des prix vers les coûts”, in Rapport 
d’activités 2002, 2003, p. 72. Similarly, Grout notes that in an industry where it is anticipated that there will be 
an enormous degree of competition, regulator is justified to pro-actively enhances competitors in its choice of 
regulatory devices (for example, using LRIC model instead of the ECPR method, relying extensively on price 
squeeze actions): P.A. Grout, Competition Law in Telecommunications and its Implications for Common 
Carriage of Water, CMPO Working Paper 02/056, July 2002 
50 Common Position on remedies, 79, and its Annex dealing with margin squeeze. 
51 For instance in case of unbundling, by adopting an approach which started from the book value of the assets 
(historic costs) as in Denmark, or using a benchmark referring to that price like the Italian regulator 
52 See the Commission web-site devoted to open-source: 
<http://europa.eu.int/information_society/activities/opensource/index_en.htm>. 
53 Article 17 of the Framework Directive; Commission List of standards and/or specifications for electronic 
communications networks, services and associated facilities and services (interim issue), O.J. [2002] C 331/32. 
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the broadcasting sector, and the possible imposition of an open API to ensure competition for 
digital interactive television services and cultural diversity54. 
 
After many political debates during the adoption of the directives, the compromise was fairly 
neutral. No open standard has been imposed, but Member States should encourage the 
providers of digital interactive TV services to use an open API and the holders of proprietary 
APIs to give access to their APIs on fair reasonable and non-discriminatory terms. Moreover, 
the Commission shall review the situation in July 2004, and possibly decide to impose an API 
if interoperability and freedom of choice were not been adequately achieved in one or more 
Member States55. 
 
 
(d) Protection of users’ interests 
 
The new Universal Service Directive carries forward the objectives of the 1998 package but 
provide a great deal of helpful clarifications56. It ensures that every European citizen gets 
access to basic services of the Information Society at an affordable price, and that Member 
State may go further than this European socle provided they do not rely on sector fund to 
finance additional mandatory services. 
 
The Directive also introduces two important new principles aiming at improving governance 
and ensuring that the public service will be provided more efficiently. The first principle 
states that retail markets controls is only justified if wholesale regulation were insufficient to 
police market behaviour57, thus calling for a drastic reduction of retail regulation. Indeed, as 
most of retail anti-competitive behaviour stems from the exercise of market power on a 
upstream wholesale market, it is more appropriate to regulate this intermediate market (source 
of the problem) than the retail market (manifestation of the problem). The second principle 
introduced by the Directive guarantees that universal service is provided in the least distorting 
way for the economy. This implies inter alia that the least costly way to ensure universal 
service is chosen by the Member State58, or that in the case of compensation from within the 
sector, the contributors' basis should be as wide as possible59.  
However, the application of these (fairly theoretical) principles may be difficult and lead to 
divergent interpretations. As for the first principle, it remains to be seen whether NRAs will 
be ready to free retail markets from their obligations. In particular, price controls on retail 
                                                 
54 Article 18 of the Framework Directive. Note that the Application Program Interface is software interface 
between applications, made available by broadcasters or service providers, and resources in enhanced digital 
television equipment for digital television and radio services. An open API may be the MHP (Muti-Home 
Platform) developed by the DVB Group.  
55 See further: Communication from the Commission of 9 July 2003 on barriers to widespread access to new 
services and applications of the information society through open platform in the digital television and third 
generation mobile communications, COM(2003) 410; Study done for the Commission services by OXERA, 
Interoperability, Service Diversity and Business Models in Digital Broadcasting Markets, March 2003. 
56 In general, see: A. de Streel, “The protection of the European citizen in a competitive e-Society: The new E.U. 
Universal Service Directive”, Journal of Network Industries 4, 2003, 189-223.  
57 Article 17 Universal Service Directive. 
58 For an overview: ERG/IRG Report of October 2003 on Universal Service Designation, ERG(03) 38. 
59 Articles 3(2), 8, 12 of the Universal Service Directive. However, the latter approach is already creating a 
distortion as far as contributions are calculated on number of minutes or turnover and thus imposing a high 
burden on services with a low margin, such as broadband access via unbundled loops or IP voice. In other words, 
while this second principle introduced sound for economic principles in the regulatory arena, it did not avoid 
unintended side-effects. 
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markets are currently used by NRAs to monitor ex ante possible price squeeze (and time 
squeezes) between wholesale and retail offers. In the absence of controls on retail prices, a 
NRA can only intervene ex post as a competition authority60. As for the second principle, the 
method to designate the universal service provider or to calculate of the net cost may still vary 
in the Member States. Finally, note that the consumer protection provisions of the directives 
are only minimal (and not complete) harmonisation. Thus, they allow further national rules on 
consumer protection in conformity with Community Law, for instance to protect the small 
and medium sized enterprises61. 
 
  
3.3. The institutional design 
 
Next to the substantive rules, the directives provide for an ‘institutional design’ when defining 
the tasks and procedure of the regulatory trinity (NRAs, national Courts, and the European 
Commission). 
 
The first actor (the NRA), already crucial under the 1998 package, has seen its powers 
considerably increased with the new directives62. Strong national regulators are now at the 
heart of the organisation of the electronic communications markets, which may have clashed 
in the past with a conservative interpretation of the Constitutions of some continental Member 
States. Fortunately, these concerns seem now to have been abated in most of these countries63. 
To ensure appropriate regulatory decisions, the Framework Directive64 provide some very 
general rules on the national institutions, which define the tasks, the main characteristics 
(independence, sufficient resources), and the powers of the NRAs. They also set the 
institutional checks and balances (like the consultation to be held with the public and the 
competition authority, or the scope of judicial review) to ensure following Montesquieu that 
le pouvoir arrête le pouvoir. In particular the directives put in place some forbearance 
mechanisms in order to alleviate the risk of regulatory inflation: like the three broad policy 
objectives in the Framework directive, the market-by-market sunset clause embodied in the 
SMP regime, or the effective appeal process. 
 
Moreover, NRAs should co-operate with each other and with the Commission to ensure a 
consistent application across Europe of the new Directives65, which is particular important to 
implement a framework which is more derived from theory than from practical experience. 
Thus the directives provide that NRAs should consult each other on draft measures imposing 
                                                 
60 This was evidenced by the roughly 20% wholesale price cuts from France Télécom on 1st January 2004 and 
simultaneous and well marketed retail price cuts of Wanadoo’s retail offers (the price of the 512k service to 
€34.90/month, down by 23% from €45.42/month, and €29.90/month on a 24-month contract).  The NRA had 
proposed to allow the retail price cuts only from 1 April onwards, in order to allow competing ISPs to adapt their 
marketing strategy on a level playing field, but the French Minister had not followed the proposal from the NRA, 
and authorised without delay the retail price cuts.  This sequence of events reveals the vulnerability of alternative 
operators in the absence of ex ante retail price controls. Note that in Germany, DT is obliged to provide parallel  
corresponding wholesale product when filing tariff approval application for new retail products (§ 37 (4) TKG). 
61 See Article 20(1) and Recital 49 of the Universal Service Directive. 
62 For an overview: D. Stevens and P. Valcke, “NRAs (and NCAs?): the Cornerstones for the Application of the 
New Electronic Communications Regulatory Framework, Communications & Stratégies 50, 2003, 159-192. In 
general, see: D. Geradin and N. Petit, The Development of Agencies at EU and National Levels: Conceptual 
Analysis and Proposals for Reform, Jean Monnet Working Paper 01/04. 
63 See generally: Rapport public du Conseil d’Etat français, Les autorités administratives indépendentes, La 
Documentation française, 2001. 
64 In particular, Articles 3 to 8 of the Framework Directive. 
65 Article 7(2) of the Framework Directive. 
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obligations to an SMP operator, and collaborate for the analysis of trans-national market or 
the resolution of cross-border disputes66. Moreover, some institutional fora are set up for the 
Ministries and NRAs to talk to each other and exchange best practices. The Framework 
Directive sets up the Communications Committee (COCOM), which is a standard Committee 
composed of representatives of Member States67. It aims to assist (and control) the 
Commission in implementing the new directives. In addition, the Commission sets up in 2002 
the European Regulators Group (ERG) that is composed of the NRAs of each Member State 
and the Commission68. It aims to provide an interface between the NRAs and the Commission 
to contribute to the development of common regulatory culture. To do so, the ERG looks in 
more detail to certain particular and politically sensitive problems and tries to develop a 
common approach, such as remedies, bitstream, and LRIC methodology69. Finally, there is the 
Independent Regulators Group (IRG)70, which was established in 1997 as an informal group 
of NRAs from the Member States and other European countries members of the EEE, without 
the Commission. The broad objective of the IRG is to share experience and exchange point of 
view on issues of common interest amongst its members. To do so, the IRG looks also at 
several detail regulatory issues and decided Principles of Implementation and Best practices 
(PIBs)71.  
 
The role of the second actor of the trinity -national Courts- also increases72. First, the scope of 
judicial review has been broadened to include the merits of the case73. Second, the incentives 
to appeal have been increased by the alignment of the SMP regime with competition law 
methodologies. Indeed, if an operator is designated as having SMP, it will probably be 
presumed to have a dominant position in an antitrust proceeding as well74. Hence, the operator 
has a double incentive to appeal the NRA’s decision: to lift regulation, and also not to be 
                                                 
66 Articles 7(3), 16(5), 21 of the Framework Directive. 
67 Set up by the Article 22 of the Framework Directive and with a website at: 
<http://forum.europa.eu.int/Public/irc/infso/cocom1/home>. For spectrum matters, there is the Radio Spectrum 
Committee-RSC, set up by the Article 3 of the Radio Spectrum Decision and with the website at 
<http://forum.europa.eu.int/Public/irc/infso/radiospectrum/home>. 
68 Commission Decision of 29 July 2002 establishing the European Regulators Group for Electronic 
Communications Networks and Services, O.J. [2002] L 200/38. For spectrum matters, there is the Radio 
Spectrum Policy Group (RSPG) composed of high level governmental experts of each Member States and the 
Commission, set up by Commission Decision of 26 July 2003 establishing a Radio Spectrum Policy Group, O.J. 
[2002] L 198/49. See the website of ERG: <http://erg.eu.int>; and of the RSPG: <http://rspg.groups.eu.int>.  
69 ERG Interim Document of 20 November 2003 on Bitstream Access, ERG(03) 34; ERG Consultation 
Document of July 2003 on a Proposed ERG common position on FL-LRIC modelling. 
70 See: <http://irgis.icp.pt/site/en/>. 
71 For instance: PIBs of 20 November 2003 on the application of remedies in the mobile voice call termination 
market; PIBs of of 24 September 2003 regarding cost recovery principles; PIBs of 9 July 2003 regarding 
Itemised Billing; PIBs of 19 May 2003 regarding call barring; PIBs of 19 May 2003 regarding Disconnection; 
PIBs of 18 October 2001 regarding Local Loop Unbundling (as amended in May 2002); PIBs of 24 November 
2000 regarding FL-LRIC cost modelling. 
72 For the role of the Courts under the 1998 package: A. Ottow “Dispute Resolution under the new European 
Framework” in Report of the Third Conference of the Round Table Expert Group on Telecommunications Law, 
December 2003; British Institute of International and Comparative Studies, Effective Access and Procedure in 
Telecommunications Disputes in Europe, 2004; E. Dommering (ed), Zes Jaar Bestuur en Rechtspraak in de 
Telecommunicatiemarket, 2004. 
73 Article 4 of the Framework Directive. Note that under the national implementation of the 1998 framework, the 
judicial review was already broad in some countries (like Germany or the Netherlands) but not in others (like 
Austria or the UK). See also the indications in Connect Austria C-462/99 [2003] I-5197, para 37-40 : due to the 
direct effect of Article 5 Directive 90/387, national appeal should be sufficient, otherwise national law should be 
dis-applied. 
74 Note however, that a SMP designation does not automatically imply a dominant position: Guidelines on 
market analysis, para 30. 
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presumed as being dominant. Moreover, as dominant position is difficult to assess, it is quite 
easily challengeable. Third, in some countries, the appeal of regulatory decisions is now 
located at a Court specialised in antitrust law, which would then be more at ease to strictly 
review and possibly set aside an NRA decision75. 
 
The role of the third actor of the trinity -the European Commission- has also been modified. 
First, the Commission should ensure compliance of Member States with European law (via 
infringement procedures). This has been enhanced by the Article 7 review. Second, the 
Commission should ensure implementation of European law, next to the Member States (via 
the adoption of implementing measures), as well as a common regulatory approach in Europe 
(via its role inside the ERG and the RSPG). 
 
 
3.4. The risks of the 2003 Framework 
 
After this rapid tour d’horizon, we observe that the new directives rely extensively on ‘open 
norms’ (broad objectives and high level regulatory principles) instead of clear and precise 
rules, thereby leaving large discretionary powers to the regulatory actors. This should not be 
problematic as such. Indeed, there is a general tendency of the law to rely more on flexible 
concepts76. In particular, for a sector evolving rapidly and in unpredictable way, it would not 
have been appropriate to freeze in non-easily modifiable hard-law instruments a policy vision 
based on a specific market design reflecting a political agreement achieved at a specific 
moment in time. In any case, this latter option was not feasible politically due to the diverging 
positions of the Member States.  
 
The extensive use of ‘open norms’ may be problematic if their interpretations would lead to 
over-regulation. The new directives were deemed to be deregulatory77, and during the 
adoption of the Directives, the three main EU Institutions argued in favour of a progressive, 
but complete, phasing out of the economic regulation to the benefit of the mere application of 
antitrust law78. Similarly, the Commissioner in charge of Competition refers to the time when 
only antitrust will be applicable79, and the Commissioner in charge of Information Society 
refers to a time when several infrastructures will compete against each other and sector-
specific economic regulation will be completely phased out80.  
 
                                                 
75 For instance, in the UK, the appeal of Ofcom’s decisions have been located to the Competition Tribunal. In 
Belgium, the appeal against BIPT’s decisions have been moved from the Council of State to the Appeal Court of 
Brussels. On this point: P. Strivens, “New Access Conditions-a Challenge to Competitive Telecoms Operators 
and Services Providers”, C.T.L.R., 2003, 123. 
76 F. Ost et M. van de Kerchove, De le la pyramide au réseau?: Pour une théorie dialectique du droit, Bruylant, 
2002. 
77 Note that Larouche identified this rhetoric as an underlying assumption of the 2003 Framework: "A closer 
look at some assumptions underlying EC regulation of electronic communications", Journal of Network 
Industries 3, 2002, p. 140. 
78 Communication Review 1999, cited at note 18, p. 49; Resolution of the European Parliament of 13 June 2000 
on the 1999 Communications Review of the Commission A5-0145/2000, O.J. [2001] C 67/53, Point A; 
Statement of Reasons of the Council Common Position 38/2001 of 17 September 2001 on the Framework 
Directive, O.J. [2001] C 337/51, para II.1. 
79 M. Monti, Competition and Regulation in the new Framework, Speech of 15.7.2003. 
80 E. Liikanen, Accelerating Broadband in Europe, Speech of 28.1.2003: ‘Competing network infrastructures are 
essential for achieving sustainable competition in network and services in the long term. When facilities-based 
competition is effective, the new framework will require ex-ante obligations to be lifted. Investment in new and 
competing infrastructure will bring forward the day when these obligations can be relaxed”. 
 15
However, the wordings of the Directives are fairly neutral and may well be relied on to 
increase regulation. It is true that the revised SMP regime contains an in-build clause to 
remove regulation when competition develops (market-by-market sunset clause). At the same 
time, the directives open the possibility to extend the 1998 regulation that was more or less 
linked to the ‘original sin’ infrastructures to any infrastructure where antitrust would be 
insufficient to police market behaviour. Thus, economic regulation will apply when and until 
it can control market power more efficiently than antitrust. A complete removal of sector 
regulation may never happen for at least two reasons. First, the ideal situation of perfect 
facilities-based competition may never materialise, as the characteristics of some new 
infrastructure (like the fibre-to-home) may re-introduce natural monopoly characteristics in 
the local access81. Second, even if there is effective facilities-based competition, which does 
not necessarily remove any structural market failure in the sector that would justified 
economic regulation82. Moreover, the institutional mechanisms to curb the regulatory creep 
(like the SMP regime or the appeal mechanism) are weak and may not be enough to 
counterbalance the increased possibilities and incentives for the NRAs and the operators to 
expand regulation beyond its optimal level83. In effect, some NRA like Oftel have an elastic 
supply function of regulation through practising narrow regulation. This should be combined 
with an elastic and outward-shifting demand function as the incentives for firms is to expand 
their use of regulation until they equate the marginal benefits of an extra euro spent on 
regulation with their marginal costs84.  
 
In practice, the initial application of the new directives does not curb the regulatory creep we 
saw under the 1998 package in the fixed segment (from local loop unbundling to bitstream 
access to part circuits) as well as in the mobile (cost orientation of termination charges)85. It is 
true that some deregulation has taken place. For instance, the minimum set of leased lines has 
been reduced from seven to five types of lines, or the mobile access and origination market 
has been de-regulated in the UK86. Even though these steps have been welcomed and much 
underlined by the Commission, that should not hide the fact in many other market segments, 
regulation is actually increasing. Many soft-law instruments or individual NRAs’ decisions go 
in this direction. For instance, the ERG suggests that in the fixed world that bitstream will be 
strictly regulated and that non-reciprocity interconnection charges might be allowed, and in 
the mobile world that termination and roaming charges will have to be cost-oriented87. The 
                                                 
81 Along these lines, see: J. Cas, “Fallacies and Inefficiencies of Telecom Regulation in Europe”, 
Communications & Stratégies 51, 2003, p. 109. 
82 For instance, under some circumstances, operators may have market power on their termination charges, 
although there is facilities-based competition. See in general: M. Armstrong, "The Theory of Access Pricing and 
Interconnection", in M. Cave, S. Majumdar, I. Vogelsang (eds), Handbook of Telecommunications Economics, 
V.I: Structure, Regulation and Competition, North-Holland, 2002, 297-386. 
83 M. Cave, “Ofcom and light touch regulation”, in C. Robinson (ed), Successes and Failures in Regulating and 
Deregulating Utilities, E. Elgar, 2004; J. Stern, “Regulatory forbearance: why did Oftel find it so hard?”, 
Telecommunications Policy, 2004, 273-294; L. Waverman, “Regulatory incentives and deregulation in 
telecommunications” in C. Robinson (ed), Competition and Regulation in Utility Markets, E. Elgar, 2003, 138-
159. 
84 To make thing worse, there is a negative externality as the marginal costs for the firms of using regulation are 
simply their internal costs, as they do not pay the costs imposed on others. 
85 In some way, the exchange of best practices under the 1998 package seem to be one-sided. It refers to 
regulatory practices, and not to de-regulatory ones. 
86 IP/03/1114 of 25 July 2003, and IP/03/1203 of 5 September 2003. Note that the situation of the UK mobile 
origination market is particular with four operators having more or less equal market shares. In most of the other 
European countries, the leading operators has over 40% market shares, hence the de-regulatory move of the UK 
could not be followed elsewhere. 
87 See note 69. 
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thrust of the Common Position on remedies is also fairly regulatory88. Some (or even all of 
these) may be justified for economic reasons, but it remains that it may equally be due by the 
lack of incentives to decrease regulation. Indeed, additional forbearance mechanisms may be 
think of: a regulatory cap for regulators (they may not expand over time a weighed average 
index of regulation)89; appropriate fines for entrants and incumbents so as to ensure that 
regulation will not be used as a strategic output90; a systematic review of the need of 
regulation91, preferably with some external to the NRA involved like the competition 
authority. 
 
Similarly, open norms may be problematic if their interpretations would lead to inconsistent 
regulation. One of the aims of the 1999 Review and the new directives was to foster 
harmonisation and the single market, which was perceived as the parent pauvre of the 1998 
package. 
 
However the wordings of the directives allow different regulatory strategies. Moreover, the 
additional mechanisms to ensure harmonisation between the Ministries, the NRAs, and the 
national Courts (like ERG, Commission veto on NRAs’ decisions,…) are relatively weak and 
may be insufficient92. Indeed, the three main European fora (COCOM, ERG, IRG) have 
important drawbacks. First, the membership is not always clear. In principle the COCOM 
should be composed of the Ministries and the ERG of the NRAs, but in practice, some 
Ministries want to attend ERG and some NRAs are represented in COCOM. Second, the 
division of labour between the groups is not clear because there is considerable overlap 
between the ERG and the IRG (although the issues covered by ERG appear to be narrower 
than those covered by IRG93). That is a problem as the working methods are different: in the 
ERG, there is more transparency and the Commission is present. Finally, ERG and IRG work 
very much on a consensual basis, and there is no possibility for a majority, or even a super 
majority of the NRAs, to impose a strategy on one of its members94. In addition, the enhanced 
role of national courts has not been accompanied by additional mechanisms to ensure 
consistency of judicial decisions across Member States. There is only the standard preliminary 
ruling procedure at the European Court of Justice. However, this procedures is very slow (2 to 
3 years)95, which is not appropriate to a sector evolving rapidly under complex regulation. 
Other mechanisms may have been provided, similarly to what was achieved for the 
decentralisation of the European competition law (for instance the possibility of the 
Commission to intervene as amicus curiae in the national court proceedings)96. We could 
hope that some exchange of information will take place among the European Judicial 
                                                 
88 Possibility of regulating emerging markets, extensive use of cost-orientation obligation, extensive reading of 
the possibilities to regulated offered by Article 9 Access Directive. 
89 L. Waverman, cited at note 83, p. 145.  
90 See on the abuse of competition law action: ITT Promedia/Commission T-111/96 ECR [1998] II-2937. 
91 Like provided in Article 6(4) of the UK 2003 Communications Act. 
92 Note that Larouche, cited at 20, p. 85 is less pessimistic. 
93 ERG-IRG Work Programme 2004, p. 1. 
94 Article 4(4) of the Interim Rules of Procedures for ERG, ERG(03) 07.  
95 Until now, it has been used only 10 times under the 1998 framework.  
96 Article 15 of the Council Regulation 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in Article 81 and 82 of the Treaty, O.J. [2003] L 1/1; Commission Notice of 30 March 
2004 on the co-operation between the Commission and the courts of the EU Member States in the application of 
Articles 81 and 82 EC, O.J. [2004] L 101/54. This amicus curiae procedure may be heavy as it requires a 
decision of the Commission. 
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Network, although this forum is mainly suited for cross-border disputes and not so much to 
ensure consistency of decisions concerning purely internal disputes97. 
 
On balance, the new directives may in practice lead to less harmonisation in term of range of 
obligation imposed on operators but also more critically in terms of regulatory vision. Note 
that under specific conditions, less harmonisation is not necessarily such a bad policy like for 
the broadband regulation98. 
 
Finally, open norms are problematic if their interpretations are unpredictable and they 
undermine legal certainty. The new directives were to enhance legal certainty and investor 
confidence but it seems that the open norms contained therein hide several policy conflicts 
that make their implementation difficult to predict. There are gaps between an explicit 
deregulatory rhetoric and actual interventionist moves, or between the harmonisation motto 
and the reluctance of Member State to tie their hands and compromise. There is also an 
apparent contradiction between the eEurope Action Plan and the 2003 Framework. The 
contradiction may possibly be resolved99, as the eEurope’s objectives would primarily be 
fulfilled by market mechanisms, and it is only in case of market failure that the State should 
intervene in the most efficient way. However, it remains that the interventionist logic of 
eEurope  (an instrument of positive integration, placing lots of confidence in the State setting 
objectives and intervening pro-actively to achieve them) contrasts with the liberal logic of the 
new directives (an instrument of negative integration, distrusting the State). This raises the 
more ‘ontological’ question of the role of the NRAs, that should decide if they are mere 
economic regulator, or active industrial policy maker100. 
 
To sum up, the use of ‘open norms’ would have been welcomed in this sector if they were 
accompanied by strong forbearance and harmonisation mechanisms and were not hiding 
unresolved policy conflicts. It is not the case and that is worrying as they may lead to 
regulatory costs increase. All the more so that the Commission, probably the main actor that 
could ensure minimal and harmonised regulation, has a very ambiguous institutional role, to 
which we now turn. 
 
 
4.  Ambiguities in the role of the Commission 
 
As we have seen the third member of the regulatory trinity has two different roles that may 
clash between each other. First, the Commission should ensure Member States compliance 
with European law. It may do so with its standard powers as the guardian of the Treaty, but 
also with its new and far reaching powers under the 2003 Framework and with its role as the 
antitrust authority. Second, the Commission should ensure consensus between Member States 
and/or NRAs when applying day-to-day the new directives. It may do so with its standard 
powers of adopting implementation measures, but also with its new role inside the ERG.  
 
                                                 
97 Council Decision of 28 May 2001 establishing a European Judicial Network in civil and commercial matters, 
O.J. [2001] L 174/25; see also: <http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/ejn/index.htm>. 
98 T. Brennan, “The FCC and policy federalism: broadband Internet access regulation” in G. Madden (ed), 
International Handbook of Telecommunications Economics V. III, 2003, E. Elgar, 173-199; However, that is not 
the case for mobile regulation: T.W. Hazlett, Is Federal Pre-emption Efficient In Cellular Phone Regulation?, 
Working Paper of the AEI-Brookings Joint Centre for Regulatory Studies, September 2003. 
99 See E. Liikanen, Accelerating Broadband in Europe, Speech of 28.1.2003. 
100 On the related question of the relationship between industrial policy and antitrust, see: W. Sauter, 
Competition Law and Industrial Policy in the EU, Clarendon Press, 1997. 
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4.1. The Commission as a referee  
 
(a) Commission ensuring correct implementation of the 2003 Framework 
 
As the guardian of European law, the Commission enjoys under the EC Treaty specific 
powers to ensure a timely and correct transposition of the new directives into national laws. In 
its ninth implementation report101, the Commission announced that it would take a particular 
attention at the main critical points of the new system to ensure its efficient functioning. 
 
The targets 
 
The major part of the 2003 Framework was supposed to be transposed and applicable 
throughout the EU on 25 July 2003 and in the ten accession countries on 1 May 2004. The 
aim of a single date was to ensure a level playing field throughout the Union. Applicable 
means for example that individual licenses would no more be required in the Member States. 
It meant also that the NRAs would, on that date start the process of assessing markets, 
designate SMP operators and review existing obligations102. 
 
However, on 25 July 2003, only five Member States had transposed the relevant directives 
(Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Sweden, and United-Kingdom)103. The transposition delays in the 
other Member States were considered to be less dramatic than under the 1998 package when 
transposition delays meant delays in liberalisation of the market. To fight such delays at that 
time, the Commission had set up in 1996 a specific “joint team” between DG Competition 
and DG Information Society in order to prepare swiftly infringement procedures, and has 
shortened the time for Member States to reply to letters of formal notice from two to one 
month. In addition, the state of transposition was monitored by that ‘joint team’ already in 
advance of the date of full liberalisation (1 January 1998), and two implementation reports104 
were published by the Commission in the course of 1997 showing of progress in the Member 
States in their transposition of the 1998 directives. The 1998 framework is now nearly 
completely in place in the current Member States. Since the objectives of the 2003 
Framework are broadly similar to those of the 1998 package, a continued application of the 
national measures transposing the latter package after 25 July 2003 does not affect 
substantially the objectives of the new directives.  
 
More than timely transposition, the issue is thus the correct transposition. In its ninth 
implementation report the Commission has already mentioned a number of national 
provisions (some of them still in draft form) which go against objectives of the 2003 
Framework. 
 
As regards the institutional provisions, the Commission had concerns on the national rules 
that do not confer enough independence and/or sufficiently wide powers and discretion to 
NRAs to allow them to fulfil their new duties. As regards the objective to simplify rules on 
                                                 
101 Communication from the Commission of 19 November 2003, Ninth Implementation Report, COM(2003) 
715. 
102 See COCOM 03-17 (timing of notifications under Article 7 Directive). 
103 IP/03/1121 of 25 July 2003. Note in addition that the e-Privacy Directive has been transposed by its deadline 
of 31 October 2003 by five countries (Denmark, Spain, Italy, Austria and Sweden). Note also that by 31 October 
2003, six countries had notified measures transposing the Competition Directive (Denmark, Ireland, Italy, 
Austria, Finland and the United Kingdom). 
104 Available at: <http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/competition/liberalization/others/>. 
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market entry, the Commission had concerns on the provisions which do not reflect the 
principles that must apply to grant of individual rights of use of frequencies, as well as to the 
level of administrative charges. As regards the objective to guarantee universal service, the 
Commission had concerns on provisions which do not clearly define the scope of the 
universal service in accordance with the new directives, and the requirement that any 
mechanism for designating universal service providers and for funding any unfair burden on 
them is to be established in a way that minimises market distortions and upholds the principle 
of non-discrimination. 
 
 
The means available to the Commission 
 
As noted in its recent Communication on the control of application of EU law105, the 
Commission may rely on several instruments to ensure compliance of the Member States, 
some being more formal than others. 
 
The Commission services firstly provide interpretative guidance on particular provisions of 
the new directives, in reply to specific questions coming from Ministries, NRAs or 
undertakings and associations with interests in the communications sector. Bilateral 
discussions have been held with several Member States on draft transposition laws. Where 
possible, responses from Commission services to interpretative questions have been made 
available on a collective basis, and at the level of the principles involved, within the 
framework of the Communications Committee106. This approach aimed to foster the objective 
of achieving consistency of application across the Community, made interested parties 
(including COCOM members) aware of specific issues of interpretation which were probably 
also relevant to their own situations, and enabled Committee members to give their views on 
the issues concerned. This approach has been run in parallel with other initiatives of the 
Commission in this field, such as the preparation of a Users Guide and the publication of a 
substantial amount of relevant information on the website of DG Information Society. 
 
A second mean used by the Commission was the publication on November 2003 of its ninth 
annual review of the state of transposition in each Member State. The attention of the broader 
public was drawn on this publication by a press release and the report was made available on 
line on the web-site of DG Information Society107. The annual implementation reports aim to 
inform public opinion and stakeholders in such a way that pressure would be put, including 
‘peer pressure”, on the concerned actors in the Member States. In marketing terms, this 
initiative would be seen as a “pull” approach. 
 
                                                 
105 Communication from the Commission of 11 December 2002, Better monitoring of the application of 
Community law, COM(2002)725, adopted as a follow-up of the White Paper of the Commission of 25 July 2001 
on the European Governance, O.J. [2001] C 287/17. 
106 See: ONPCOM 02-12 (Timeframe for implementation); ONPCOM 02-13 (Provision of information to NRAs 
for the initial market analyses); ONPCOM 02-24 (Impact on infringement proceedings); ONPCOM02-14 
(Implications for broadcasting); COCOM 02-06 (Commission services’ working documents on transposition); 
COCOM 02-08 (Present structure and powers of the NRAs); COCOM 02-29 (Issues relating to transposition of 
the new regulatory framework for electronic communications); COCOM 03-14 (comparative table on Privacy 
Directive), COCOM 03-17 (timing of notifications under Article 7 Directive); COCOM 03-25 (Digital 
interactive television in the new framework); COCOM 03-33 (opt-in approach regarding unsolicited emails); 
COCOM 03-37 (Notification to the Commission and communications requirements); COCOM 03-38 (Costing 
the transport of ‘must-carry’ channels). 
107 IP/03/1572 of 19 November 2003. 
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A third mean which is original in European law and new to the electronic communications 
sector is to rely on the ‘Article 7 review’ to signal to NRA infringement of European rules, 
and ultimately instruct the regulator to dis-apply its own national law (supposedly violating 
the directives). The Commission used this mean already once when commenting a draft 
decision of the Finnish NRA in the mobile sector108. It noted that the Finnish law, which 
restricts regulation of mobile termination to mobile-to-mobile calls (thus excluding fixed-to-
mobile calls), is contrary to the Access Directive. According to the case law of the Court of 
Justice, the Commission reminded the NRA of its right not to apply this Finnish law although 
it did not yet have opened an infringement procedure against Finland. However, this power of 
the Commission has been criticised by some NRAs109 as it by-pass the normal infringement 
procedure provided in the Treaty and upset the balance between harmonisation and 
subsidiarity that lies at the heart of the 2003 framework. 
 
Finally, the Commission may also open formal infringement procedures, which can be 
compared to what is known in marketing terms as a “push” approach110. In October 2003, the 
Commission opened procedures against eight Member States for delay in notification of the 
national transposition measures and brought six Member States before the Court in April 
2004111. Several reasons justify swift infringement procedures. First, it ensures legal certainty. 
That is all the more important in the case of the 2003 framework because it leaves a wide 
margin of discretion to national legislators in particular on procedural aspects. Certain 
national procedures can make the enforcement of rights acknowledged under the directives 
more cumbersome or lengthy112. Second, a decision of the Court in an infringement case may 
clarify the objective of European law that it considers that Member States do not have 
correctly transposed and/or implemented.  For instance, under the 1998 package, the Court 
specified that the lack of transparent rules was tantamount to discrimination as regards the 
granting of rights of way, since the non-discrimination obligation had to be interpreted as 
aiming at the objective of market opening113. 
 
 
(b) Commission defining the field of regulatory activity 
 
The main powers of the Commission to influence the process under the 2003 Framework are 
its competence to define the field of the SMP regime, with its power to periodically adopt the 
Recommendation on the markets susceptible to ex ante regulation (during the first step of the 
                                                 
108 Commission Decision of 17 December 2003, FI/2003/31, citing para 48-49 of Consorzio Industrie Fiammiferi 
(CIF) C-198/01 [2003] not yet published. On this case, see C. Rizza, “The Duty of National Competition 
Authorities to Disapply Anti-Competitive Domestic Legislation and the Resulting Limitations on the 
Availability of the State Action Defence”, ECLR, 2004, 126-131. 
109 See Conclusions of the 7th Plenary of the ERG, 30 January 2004, ERG(04) 11, p. 2. 
110 Note since the beginning of the liberalisation, the Court had decided 18 infringement cases related to the 
implementation of the telecommunication regulatory framework. 
111 IP/04/540 of 21 April 2004 (actions against Belgium, Germany, Greece, France, Luxembourg, and the 
Netherlands); IP/03/1356 of 8 October 2003 (formal letters against Belgium, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Portugal). With regard to the ePrivacy Directive, formal letters were sent in 
November 2003 against nine Member States (Belgium, Germany, Greece, Finland, France, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden): IP/03/1663 of 5 December 2003 and IP/04/435 of 1 April 2004.  
112 For instance, in December 2003, the press mentioned the concerns of entrants regarding the way the French 
Government envisaged implementing the obligation to give the NRA powers to review the retail tariffs of France 
Télécom: “Veut-on réduire la concurrence dans les telecoms au detriment du consommateur”, Le Monde, 17 
December 2003, p.6 
113 Commission/Luxembourg (Rights of way) C-97/01 [2003] I-5797. 
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SMP process) and to veto part of NRAs’ decisions (related to the first and the second steps of 
the SMP process). 
 
The power to issue the Recommendation on relevant markets allows the Commission to 
influence the scope of actual regulation, as it focuses the activities of the NRAs on the 
selected markets. In its first Recommendation114, the Commission identified 18 markets (7 
retail and 11 wholesale), but its discretion was strongly constrained by the Annex I of the 
Framework Directive, which contains a list of markets to be identified in the initial 
Recommendation. In practice, the Commission had merely to re-define the markets listed in 
the Annex according to competition law methodologies and add the relevant markets related 
to the broadcasting sector. However, for the next revision of the Recommendation set for End 
2005, the role of the Commission will be much more important as it will have to an even 
larger extent select the markets justifying ex-ante regulation according to the three criteria 
explained above. By doing so, it may influence the phasing out of the regulation of certain 
markets115, or conversely foster regulation of other markets. 
 
The Recommendation116 on relevant markets leaves to the NRA the possibility to notify 
markets that are not included in the list or to conclude that some of these markets are 
competitive. But these decisions that would affect the trade between Member States117 are 
reviewed by the Commission under the Article 7 procedure118. Once the draft measure is 
notified and within a period of one month (or if the national consultation period is longer, 
within that period), the Commission may indicate to the NRA that it considers that the draft 
measure would create a barrier to the single market or if it has serious doubts as to it 
compatibility with the Community law and open a so-called phase II. Then within a period of 
a further two months and having consulted the COCOM, the Commission may take a decision 
requiring the NRA concerned to withdraw the draft measure. 
 
In order to manage this consultation, two Task Forces have been set up (the eCCTF or the 
electronic Communications Consultation Task Forces), one in DG Competition, as part of the 
unit dealing with telecommunications, and another one in DG Information Society. They 
work very closely together and establish joint case teams in each case in order to draft the 
Commission reaction within the imposed tight deadlines. In order to speed up the process, the 
College of Commissioners empowered two of its members (the Commissioners in charge of 
the Information Society and in charge of Competition) to take jointly most of the decisions on 
                                                 
114 See note 26. 
115 Explanatory Memorandum of the Recommendation on relevant markets, p. 30. 
116 Any Recommendation or soft law instruments should be taken into account by national authorities and 
national Courts, see Grimaldi C-322/88 [1989] ECR I-4407 para 18. The legal force of the Recommendation on 
relevant markets is further reinforced as the Commission may veto any different product and service market that 
an NRA may wish to define on the basis that some of the criteria set out in the Recommendation are not fulfiled. 
117 According Recital 38 of the Framework Directive, "Measures that could affect trade between Member States 
are measures that may have an influence, direct or indirect, actual or potential, on the pattern of trade between 
Member States in a manner that might create a barrier to the single market. They comprise measures that have a 
significant impact on operators or users in other Member States (…)". These criteria result from the case law 
related to competition policy and the Internal market: Sociéte Technique Minière 56/65 [1966] ECR 235 at 249; 
Commercial Solvents 6/73, 7/73 [1974] ECR 223 para 30-35. See also the Commission Guidelines of 30 March 
2004 on the effect on trade concept contained in Article 81 and 82 of the Treaty. 
118 Note that if an NRA does not notify its decision to the Commission, the consequences have yet to be tested. 
The Commission may take an infringement procedure against the Member State. In addition, it is possible that 
the Court of Justice will decide that the NRA measure can not have any effect in the national legal order. For a 
similar solution in the context of the transparency Directive, see: Securitel C-194/94 [1996] ECR I-2201 para 45-
55 and Sapod Audic C-159/00 [2002] ECR I-5031 para 47-53.  
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their behalf119. In practice, the full Commission has only to decide on negative decisions at the 
end of Phase II, i.e. decisions to require a NRA to withdraw a draft measure. Subsequently, a 
sub-delegation of powers was granted to the Directors General of DG Information Society and 
DG Competition as regards to phase I decisions120. Moreover, in order to simplify and 
expedite the examination of a notified draft measure, the Commission has adopted a 
procedural recommendation121, which provides a standard format for notifications (summary 
notification form) to be used by NRAs and clarifies the notification process and the 
calculation of the legal time limits. In order to ensure transparency, most of the decisions 
related to the Article 7 control are published on the web site of the Task Forces122.  
 
In practice123, the Commission gives NRAs, who so request, an opportunity to discuss any 
draft measure they intend to adopt before formal notification (pre-notification meetings). As 
of May 2004, the task forces held 40 pre-notification meeting (with 14 different NRAs) and 
received 47 notifications (from 5 NRAs: mainly British and Finnish regulators, and also from 
the Austrian and Irish media regulator and the Dutch Ministry). 44 cases have already been 
dealt with: 40 by way of ‘comments’ letters, 2 by way of ‘incompleteness’ decision and 2 by 
way of ‘veto’ decision. These cases shed some light on the position of the Commission on the 
three steps of the SMP regime, even though each decision is case-specific. They illustrate the 
important role of the Commission in shaping the economic regulation. 
 
On the market selection, the Commission is ready to accept additional markets than those of 
the Recommendation provided the three selection criteria are fulfilled124. On market 
definition, the Commission is ready to accept more segmented markets than those of the 
Recommendation provided it is justified by the observed market conditions125. The 
Commission also notes that voice over 3G should be part of the same market than voice over 
2G if they offer the same functionalities126. On the SMP/dominance assessment, NRAs should 
determine if effective competition is (or is not) entirely or primarily the result of the 
regulation in place127. In applying competition law, the competition authority should assess 
                                                 
119 See the habilitation of 23 July 2003, SEC(2003) 857, which relates to: decisions to declare a notification 
incomplete; decisions not to make comments at the end of Phase I; decisions to make comments at the end of 
Phase I; decisions to launch a Phase II review on the basis of serious doubts as to the measure’s compatibility 
with community law or the single market; decisions, at the end of Phase II, to withdraw the Commission’s initial 
objections; decisions to approve “alternative remedies” under Article 8(3) of the Access Directive; decisions to 
reject “alternative remedies” under Article 8(3) of the Access Directive. 
120 Decisions that a notification of a draft measure is incomplete; decisions to refrain from making comments on 
a notified draft measure within the one-month period; decisions to make comments on a notified draft measure 
and/or the reasoning on which it is based, within the one-month period provided. 
121 Commission Recommendation of 23 July 2003 on notifications, time limits and consultations provided for in 
Article 7 of Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a common 
regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services, O.J. [2003] L 190/13. 
122 <http://forum.europa.eu.int/Public/irc/infso/ecctf/home> 
123 See COCOM04-27 of 5 May 2004, Article 7 update. 
124 See for instance, the UK wholesale unmetered narrowband Internet termination services (Commission 
Decision of 23 September 2003, UK/2003/4 and UK/2003/25), the UK wholesale lines rental markets 
(Commission Decision of 23 September 2003, UK/2003/11 to UK/200316), the UK route-by-route wholesale 
international services (Commission decision of 24 September 2003, UK/2003/6). 
125 See for instance, in the UK retail fixed voice service (Commission Decision of 24 September 2003, 
UK/2003/7, UK/2003/8, UK/2003/9, UK/2003/10), or the UK leased lines markets (Commission Decision of 6 
February 2004, UK/2003/35 to UK/2003/39). 
126 Commission decision of 29 August 2003, UK/2003/1. 
127 Commission Decision of 20 February 2004, FI/2003/24 and FI/2003/27, publicly available international 
telephone services provided at a fixed location for residential and non-residential customers. On this decision, 
see: A.G. Inotai and L. Di Mauro, “Market Analyses under the New Regulatory Framework for Electronic 
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the market power of the relevant company, taking into account the existing regulatory 
obligations on the latter. This is, for obvious reasons, not the case under the 2003 Framework, 
where the NRAs should compare the current market situation to the market situation absent of 
regulation. On the choice of remedies, the NRA should justify an imposition of differentiated 
remedies (for instance, different remedies according to the size of the operator) to address the 
same market failure128. More generally, the Commission noted that some cases do not affect 
trade between Member States, hence are not under its veto jurisdiction129, and that any 
modification of the draft decision notified to the Commission due to the results of the national 
public consultation should be re-notified130.  
 
But the most interesting question is the criterion used by the Commission to open a phase II 
and eventually block a NRA decision. Until now, one veto decision has been adopted. It 
relates to a draft decision of the Finnish regulator not to regulate the retail fixed international 
telephone services for residential and non-residential customers (markets 4 and 6 of the 
Recommendation on relevant markets). The NRA concluded that there is no SMP operators in 
either of the two markets, because despite the high market shares of TeliaSonera (about 55% 
of the residential market and about 50% of the non-residential market131), there are several 
operators active on the market, barriers to entry are low and customers may easily get 
international service from another operator than the one providing the line. The Commission 
required the NRA to withdraw its notified draft measure because of lack of evidence (in terms 
of market shares, prices and other market data) to support the finding of the absence of 
SMP132. 
 
This decision is interesting for two reasons. First, it concerns a market that the Finnish 
regulator did not want to regulate. Vetoing such decision did not give signal to market players 
– expected by several of them - that the policy objective is to avoid further increases of sector 
specific regulation. Nevertheless, the Commission had an interest in vetoing the Finnish 
regulator because TeliaSonera had market shares above 50% and the antitrust practice 
presumes that in the absence of exceptional circumstances such level of market shares implies 
a dominant position133. It would be difficult for Commission officials to support without 
convincing evidences during the Article 7 review that undertakings with such market shares 
are not dominant, while arguing the opposite when dealing with competition cases. Can we 
thus conclude that the Article 7 review contains a ‘regulatory bias’? Not necessarily because 
the Commission argued for lack of evidence of absence of dominance at the SMP assessment 
step, but it did not argue for more obligations at remedies step. Indeed, it was suggested that 
the obligations already imposed (like Carrier Selection and Carrier preselection134) might 
                                                                                                                                                        
Communications – Context and Principles Behind the Commission’s First Veto Decision”, Competition Policy 
Newsletter, 2004.  
128 For instance in the Finnish markets fixed calls origination and termination (Commission Decision of 17 
December 2003, FI/2003/28 and FI/2003/29), or Finnish market for mobile call termination (Commission 
Decision of 17 December 2003, FI/2003/31). 
129 For instance in UK wholesale international routes (Commission Decision of 24 September 2003, UK/2003/6). 
130 For instance Commission Decision of 24 September 2003, UK/2003/6. 
131 Note however that contrary to most EU countries, the majority of local loops in Finland are controlled by 
several local monopolist and not by TeliaSonera. Thus, the high market share of the latter on international calls 
market very much depends on the access regulation in place.  
132 Cited note 127. 
133 Guidelines on market analysis, para 75, citing the relevant case-law: Akzo C-62/86 [1991] ECR I-3359, para 
60; Irish Sugar T-228/97 [1999] ECR II-2969, para 70. 
134 Carrier selection refers to the possibility to use an alternative operator for making calls than the operator 
renting the line, by dialling a short code before the called number. In case of carrier pre-selection, the short code 
is registered in the user’s terminal, hence should not be dialled for the alternative operator to be used. 
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suffice to deal with the supposedly dominant position and to achieve the three policy 
objectives of the new directives. Second, this decision is interesting because it shows that the 
Commission does not intend to make the market assessment itself, but merely reviews the 
quality of the work of the NRA and identifies possible manifest errors in the legal or factual 
analysis. The Commission does not replace NRA’s assessment by its own, although as regard 
the markets concerned, it had probably as much factual background as the regulator, gathered 
in the framework of the annual implementation reports as well as the Telia/Sonera merger135. 
The control of the Commission on NRAs’ draft decisions is not unlike the control of the Court 
of First Instance on Commissions’ decisions. 
 
 
(c)  Commission acting as European Competition authority136  
 
In addition to its powers under the 2003 Framework, the Commission may also intervene with 
its competition law powers under the EC Treaty and control telecom private and public 
operators as well as the Member States. With regard to operators, European antitrust applies 
in addition to national sector-specific rules. Thus, firms’ compliance with national regulatory 
decisions does not absolve them of their duty to abide by obligations imposed by EC 
antitrust137. Article 86(1) EC is even more explicit for public undertakings and undertakings 
to which Member States have granted special or exclusive rights. With regard to Member 
States (including their NRAs), Articles 10 and 86(3) EC in conjunction with Articles 81 and 
82 EC implies that NRAs may not enact measures which would be contrary to European 
antitrust. In particular, the Court138 held that Articles 10 and 81 EC are infringed where a 
Member State requires or favours the adoption of agreements, decisions or concerted practices 
contrary to Article 81 EC, or where it divests its own rules of the character of legislation by 
delegating to private economic operators responsibility for taking decisions affecting the 
economic sphere. These extensive powers have allowed the Commission to stimulate and 
control the NRAs when they had jurisdiction to act under their national law, and to intervene 
and supplement these NRAs when they could not act139. 
 
When the NRAs have jurisdiction to act, the Commission may influence them in a loose way 
by issuing Guidelines setting its interpretation of European antitrust to particular problems in 
the electronic communications sector140. These soft-law instruments aim to inform operators 
                                                 
135 Commission Decision of 28 May 2002, Telia/Sonera, M. 2803. 
136 On the application of competition law to electronic communications, see: A. de Streel, “Remedies in the 
Electronic Communications Sector”, in D. Geradin (ed), Remedies in Network Industries: EC Competition Law 
vs. Sector-Specfic Regulation, Intersentia, 2004, 67-122.L. Garzaniti, Telecommunications, Broadcasting and the 
Internet: EU Competition Law and Regulation, 2nd ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 2003. 
137 Access Notice, cited at note 140, para 22. 
138 Ahmed Saeed 66/86 [1989] ECR 1839. See: J. Temple Lang, “Ahmed Saeed – National authorities must not 
approve practices or prices contrary to EC Competition law”, in M. Dony (coord.), Melanges Waelbroeck, v. II, 
Bruylant, 1999, 1539-1560; J. Temple Lang, “Community antitrust law and national regulatory procedures”, 
Fordham Corporate Law Institute, 1998, 297-334; S. Martinez Lagae and H. Brokelmann, “The application of 
Articles 85 and 86 EC to the conduct of undertakings that are complying with national legistlation”, in M. Dony 
(coord.), Melanges Waelbroeck, v. II, Bruylant, 1999, 1247-1295. On Article 86 EC, see in general: J.L. Buendia 
Sierra, Exclusive Rights and State Monopoly under EC Law, Oxford University Press, 1999. 
139 H. Ungerer, Use of EC Competition Rules in the Liberalisation of the European Union's Telecommunications 
Sector, Speech 6.5.2001; International Competition Network, Antitrust Enforcement in Regulated Sectors 
Working Group, Report to the Third ICN Annual Conference in Seoul, April 2004; N. Petit, “The Proliferation 
of National Regulatory Authorities alongside Competition Authorities: A Source of Jurisdictional Confusion”, 
Working Paper, March 2004. 
140 Until now, three guidelines have been adopted: Commission Guidelines on the application of EEC 
Competition rules in the Telecommunications sector, O.J. [1991] C 233/2; Commission Notice of 31 March 
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and deter them to behave anti-competitively, but also guide the NRAs (and the NCAs) when 
applying antitrust concepts such as price squeeze and discrimination. But the Commission 
may also influence companies and authorities in a much stringent way by opening individual 
cases against them. When the NRAs remained inactive, the Commission triggered their 
intervention by opening antitrust cases against operators and then passed the cases to the 
NRAs for them to act under their national telecom laws. For instance, the Commission opened 
cases related to excessive international accounting rates141, fixed retention and termination 
rates142, or abuses in national leased lines provisioning143. These cases were closed only when 
the NRA had intervened satisfactorily from the Commission’s view. When the NRAs was 
intervening but not satisfactorily, the Commission went that far as condemning the regulated 
private firm for infringement of competition rules. Indeed in 2003, the Commission fined 
Deutsche Telekom144 for anti-competitive price squeeze between its wholesale charges and 
retail charges of the local loop, although both charges were regulated by the German 
regulator. The Commission considered that the obligations imposed by the RegTP left to DT 
some leeway that may have been used to diminish the squeeze. The Commission opened 
several other cases against Deutsche Telekom (for anti-competitive retail business tariffs145, 
excessive charges of carrier selection and number portability146, and price squeeze between 
wholesale charge for lines sharing and retail DSL tariffs147) that implied a critique of the 
RegTP’s policy. Until now, no case has been opened against a Member State for violation of 
European law by its NRA. 
 
When the NRAs do not have jurisdiction to act under their national telecom laws, the 
Commission may supplement them preventively under the Merger control or repressively way 
under Article 82 EC. Under the merger control, the Commission imposed extensive structural 
and behavioural remedies aimed at preventing abuse of dominant position from the merging 
parties that the NRAs would be unable to police. For instance, in Telia/Telenor148, the 
Commission obtained from the parties a commitment to provide access to unbundled local 
loop that was not yet imposed in Sweden at the time of the merger. In Telia/Sonera149, the 
Commission went further and imposed a legal separation between the operation of networks 
and services of their fixed and mobile activities in Sweden and in Finland. In 
Vodafone/Mannesmann150, the Commission imposed third party access for three years on a 
                                                                                                                                                        
1998 on the application of competition rules to access agreements in the telecommunications sector, O.J. [1998] 
C 265/2; Communication from the Communication of 26 April 2000 on the Unbundled access to the local loop, 
O.J. [2000] C 272/55. 
141 IP/97/1180 of 19 December 1997; IP/98/763 of 13 August 1998. 
142 IP/98/141 of 9 February 1998; IP/98/707 of 27 July 1998; IP/98/1036 of 26 November 1998; IP/99/298 of 4 
May 1999. 
143 W. Sauter, The Sector Inquiries into Leased Lines and Mobile Roaming: Findings and follow-up, Speech 
17.9.2001. 
144 Commission Decision of 21 May 2003, Deutsche Telekom, O.J. [2003] L 263/9, appeal pending Case T-
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non-discriminatory basis to the parties’ integrated networks (wholesale services like 
interconnection and roaming) with a fast track dispute resolution procedure. Under the ex post 
control, the Commission opened several cases for abusive practices, and closed them only 
after the operators changed their behaviour to the satisfaction of the Commission. For 
instance, the Commission opened a sector enquiry dealing with the supposedly excessive 
roaming charges151, or opened individual cases for excessive international leased lines 
tariffs152. 
 
The new directives will undoubtedly change this role of the Commission. On one hand, the 
means for the Commission to control NRAs via its antitrust powers will be reinforced. First, 
the alignment of sector rules to competition law principles implies that the analysis and the 
results of the NRAs should be closer (albeit not identical153) to what a competition authority 
would conclude. Thus, the NRAs should not only abide to European antitrust, but often 
should end up with the same results. Second, the Commission has now an additional 
procedural route (the Article 7 review) to signal to the NRA any infringement of competition 
rules154. On the other hand, the role of the Commission in supplementing NRAs intervention 
should decrease. As the criteria to impose sector regulation are much more flexible under the 
new directives than previously (going from the original sin to the inefficiency of antitrust 
remedies), the scope of NRAs jurisdiction is enlarged, hence there is less rationale for the 
Commission to intervene. In particular, we may expect a decrease in the behavioural remedies 
imposed when reviewing electronic communications mergers. 
 
 
4.2.  The Commission as a coach 
 
Under the new directives, the second role of the Commission is to build consensus among the 
NRAs on a common regulatory vision and culture. This role is particularly important because 
on the one hand, the 2003 Framework leaves lots of discretion to the NRAs, and on the other 
hand, is more based on theoretical models than practical experiences (hence NRAs may not 
know what to do with their discretion). To do so, the Commission rely on two main fora: the 
Communications Committee and the ERG. 
 
 
(a) The Communications Committee (COCOM) 
 
As explained above, the Communications Committee is a standard comitology committee 
composed of representatives of Member States (usually the Ministries, but also in some cases 
the NRAs). It aims to assist the Commission in implementing the new directives and, to 
provide a say to Member States, when the Committee acts as a regulatory committee. Thus, 
the Commission was assisted by the COCOM before issuing three first harmonisation 
                                                 
151 IP/00/111 of 4 February 2000; Commission services Working Document of 13 December 2000 on the initial 
findings of the sector inquiry into mobile roaming charges; MEMO/01/262 of 11 July 2001. 
152 IP/99/786 of 22 October 1999; Commission services Working Document of 8 September 2000 on the initial 
results of the leased lines sector inquiry,; IP/00/1043 of 22 September 2000; IP/02/1852 of 11 December 2002. 
153 Guidelines on market analysis, para 24-32. 
154 Note however that the fact that the Commission refrain from signalling any violation of European antitrust 
does not impede the Commission to take later an action against the Member State for infringement (under Article 
226 or 86 EC), nor to take an action against an operator for violation of Articles 81 or 82 EC. See similarly in 
case dealing with the power of the Commission to notify to the Member States a clear and manifest infringement 
of Community provision in the field of public procurement, according to Article 3 of directive 89/665: 
Commission/The Netherlands C-359/93 [1995] I-157, para 13. 
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recommendations155: on the public R-LAN, on the processing of caller location 
information156, and on the procedural aspect of the Article 7 control. 
 
But the Committee is also a useful forum for discussion and exchange of best practices among 
Member States. For instance, the national transposition process and difficulties encountered 
by certain Member States have been discussed in the Committee, and the Commission had 
played a pedagogic but crucial role in ensuring a common interpretation of new directives. 
 
The work of the Commission can also be illustrated by its initiative to harmonise the pricing 
of terminating leased circuits, the first measure aimed to harmonise remedies to be adopted 
under Article 19 of the Framework Directive. Since 2002, the Commission discussed with the 
COCOM a draft Recommendation on the provision of leased lines in the European Union to 
update a previous Commission Recommendation157. Part 1 of the Recommendation deals with 
the major supply conditions for wholesale leased lines158, whereas Part 2 deals with the 
pricing of wholesale leased lines part circuits. Under the Recommendation on relevant 
markets, Member States must review both the markets for wholesale terminating segments of 
leased lines and wholesale trunk segments of leased lines (respectively market 13 and 14). 
Thus, Part 2 of the Recommendation on leased lines will apply in all cases where NRAs 
impose obligations for non-discrimination and/or cost orientation on operators providing 
leased line services (albeit only to the provision of leased lines part circuits and of wholesale 
leased lines). 
 
 
(b) The European Regulators Group (ERG) 
 
As explained, the ERG is composed of the NRAs of each Member States and the Commission 
services (DG Information Society and DG Competition) and aims to develop a common 
regulatory culture. It is a useful forum where the Commission may try to steer and develop 
best practices across NRAs. However, the relationship between the IRG (whose the 
Commission is not part) and the ERG (whose is part) is not clear, hence the role of the 
Commission is rendered even more complicated. 
 
The work of the Commission in consensus building can best be illustrated with its approach to 
foster a consistent approach on remedies. In 2002, the Commission appointed economic 
consultants to reflect on which competition problems could be expected in fixed, mobile and 
broadband markets and which could be the proportionate remedies159. A discussion between 
the Commission services, NRAs and consultants took place at the end of 2003 and the 
beginning of 2004. A steering group brought to the floor several fundamental issues that were 
further discussed by the head of the NRAs at the ERG meetings, and then arrived at a wording 
                                                 
155 Article 19 of the Framework Directive. 
156 Respectively, Commission Recommendation of 20 March 2003 on the harmonisation of the provision of 
public R-LAN access to public electronic communications networks and services in the Community, O.J. [2003] 
L 78/12; Commission Recommendation of 25 July 2003 on the processing of caller location information in 
electronic communication networks for the purpose of location-enhanced emergency call services, O.J. [2003] L 
189/49. 
157 Commission Recommendation of 24 November 1999 on leased lines interconnection pricing in a liberalised 
telecommunications market, C(1999) 3863. 
158 Commission Recommendation on wholesale leased lines – Part 1: Major supply conditions, to be adopted. 
159 See the reports of the Economic Expert Group on Remedies, Sept. 2003, available at: 
<http://www.europa.eu.int/information_society/topics/ecomm/useful_information/library/studies_ext_consult/in
dex_en.htm>. 
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that revealed the complexities of the underlying issues as well as the different approaches 
taken by different NRAs. A Common position was finally adopted by the ERG in April 2004.  
 
4.3. Can you be a referee and a coach at the same time? 
 
Thus, the Commission should be the referee of the Ministries and the NRAs sanctioning 
(under the control of the Court of Justice) those which infringe European law, and at the same 
time the coach of these Ministries and NRAs trying to develop a common team spirit. That is 
not new as the Treaty itself requires the Commission to be the guardian of the Treaty and to 
implement European law (with the Member States committee, thus implying a coaching role). 
But both roles have been considerably reinforced, and the opposition between each has been 
radicalised. This dual role is not necessarily a bad solution to ensure a common regulatory 
approach in Europe and ultimately a single market for electronic communications. In any 
case, it was probably the only feasible political option at the time of the adoption of the 
directives. The Council was strongly opposed to the creation of a European regulatory 
authority and the Commission could only ask to increase the dual powers it enjoys from the 
Treaty. 
 
However, being a referee and a coach is not easy. That will require a skilful use of each of its 
power from the Commission, as well as a loyal collaboration from the Ministries and the 
NRAs (in the spirit of Article 10 EC) to ensure the success of the common culture. Only this 
way, the Commission will assume effectively its ultimate responsibility of ensuring effective 
application of the new directives160. We have seen as an example of the conflict between 
political rhetoric and actual actions that the new directives may in practice lead to less 
harmonisation in term of range of obligation imposed on operators but also more critically in 
terms of regulatory vision161. If it were to be the case, the European Parliament will probably 
bring back the issue of a European regulator during the next legislative review in 2006162. 
 
 
 
5. The way forward 
 
The new directives contain more ‘open norms’ than the 1998 package. In particular, it does 
not define when competition law remedies are sufficient to address potential market failures 
or what the appropriate remedies are. These kind of open norms may become a problem if 
they would lead to over-regulation, incompatible regulatory strategies across Member States, 
or legal uncertainty undermining investment incentives and the internal market. 
 
                                                 
160 Recital R of Resolution of the European Parliament of 18 November 2003 on the Eight Report from the 
Commission on the implementation of the Telecommunications Regulatory package, A5-0376/2003. 
161 Note that under specific conditions, less harmonisation is not necessarily such a bad policy: T. Brennan, “The 
FCC and policy federalism: broadband Internet access regulation” in G. Madden (ed), International Handbook of 
Telecommunications Economics V. III, 2003, E. Elgar, pp. 173-199; T.W. Hazlett, Is Federal Pre-emption 
Efficient In Cellular Phone Regulation?, Working Paper of the AEI-Brookings Joint Centre for Regulatory 
Studies, September 2003. 
162 The creation of an European Regulator was already backed by the European Parliament before the 1999 
Review, but was rejected by the Commission and the Council. See on that issue the study of 
Eurostrategies/Cullen International, The possible added value of a European Regulatory Authority for 
telecommunications, Dec. 1999,  available at: <http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/infosoc/telecompolicy/en/Study-
en.htm>. 
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To alleviate these dangers, regulatory actors should first articulate and formulate clearly their 
regulatory vision, showing that they have a genuine understanding of the techno-economic 
conditions of the industry. As the main regulatory actor, the NRA should state clearly in soft-
law instruments (like the Common Position on remedies and the PIBs) or milestone individual 
cases their objectives, the means they envisage to achieve them, and the rationale behind 
them. The Commission could also set out its vision more clearly in the soft-law (in particular 
in the future reviews of the Recommendation on the markets to be regulated ex-ante, and, in 
the meantime, in the yearly implementation reports). Second, these visions should respect the 
principle of forbearance and minimal regulation, and guarantee investment incentives. Third, 
these visions should be discussed between all regulatory actors (being national or European) 
and then agreed at the European level. 
 
The initial application of the new directives indicates that these three suggestions have been 
taken on board, but insufficiently. Policy strategies should be clearer, better based on the self-
restraint principle and better discussed in the various European fora. To achieve this, we 
submit that all forbearance mechanisms in place in the new directives should be fully 
exploited and that all co-operation settings put in place should be used loyally in a spirit of 
compromise by the various regulatory actors (Ministries, NRAs, National Courts, European 
Commission). Finally, there is a need to formulate in a SMART (Specific, Measurable, 
Achievable, Relevant, Timely) way “themes” or “indicators”163 to compare the harshness as 
well as the effectiveness of the action of the NRAs. If possible, a Weighted Average measure 
of Regulation (WAR) may be designed. In addition, more dis-aggregated indicators may 
required to assess the assimilation of the objectives of the new framework by the NRAs of the 
new Member States. Annex II of this paper suggests a number of indicators, relating to the 
structure, conduct and performance of the industry, as well as the regulatory strategies that are 
followed. 
 
La route de l’enfer est pavée de bonnes intentions. Surely, the new European regulation for 
electronic communications and the alignment of the SMP regime on antitrust methodologies 
is based on sound premises. It should deliver a more flexible, efficient and economic 
regulation. But it carries several dangers, like dis-harmonisation or increase in regulatory 
costs, which may lead the sector to the Hell such that the application of the new directives 
may end up like the much criticised application of the 1996 US Telecom Act, with pervasive 
(and perverse) regulation, and multiple legal challenges and heavy regulatory costs164. Let’s 
hope that conscious of these dangers, NRAs, the Commission and the national judges will 
apply their new powers intelligently. Then, progress will be made on the way of the so 
promising e-Society! 
 
 
                                                 
163 J. Cas, cited at note 81, p. 103 also calls for more dynamic indicators. 
164 On the US situation, see J.G. Sidak, “The Failure of Good Intentions: The WorldCom Fraud and the Collapse 
of American Telecommunications After Deregulation”, Yale Journal of Regulation 20, 2003, 207: number of 
pages in the official compendium of the FCC decisions and proceedings has nearly tripled since the passage of 
the 1996 Telecom Act, while the membership in the Federal Communications Bar Association increased by 73% 
between 1995 and 1998 and has remained essentially at that level. See also A.E. Kahn, Lessons from 
Deregulation: Telecommunications and Airlines after the Crunch, AEI-Brookings Joint Centre for Regulatory 
Studies, 2003. 
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ANNEX 1: INDICATORS UNDER 1998 FRAMEWORK165 
 
 
1. Institutional issues  
 
National regulatory authorities (NRAs) 
 
- Legal and functional independence of the NRA from network operators and 
service/equipment providers. (e.g. Is staff seconded from operators/equipment providers to the 
NRA? Is there a ‘revolving door’ between the NRA and the incumbent as regards staff?)  
 
- Separation of the control and regulatory function where Member States retain ownership or 
significant control of the incumbent.  (e.g.: structures in place ensuring that regulatory 
decisions are not influenced by ownership considerations, no officials from the bodies to 
which NRA tasks have been assigned participating directly or indirectly in the management of 
the incumbent, or vice versa). 
 
- Sufficient powers devolved to NRAs relating principally to: 
- licensing (in particular supervision of the licensing procedure and the amendment and 
withdrawal of licences); 
- interconnection (in particular the power to supervise the reference interconnection offer 
(RIO) and the implementation of suitable cost accounting systems and to secure 
interconnection and resolve disputes); 
- leased lines (in particular supervision of refusal, interruption or reduction of availability 
and ensuring application of the non-discrimination principle); 
- universal service (in particular ensuring affordability and monitoring any financing 
scheme); 
- and tariffs (in particular supervision of the application of the principle of cost-orientation 
for voice telephony and leased lines and the implementation of suitable cost accounting 
systems). 
Further powers are devolved relating to numbering, frequencies and rights of way. An 
indication of the effective exercise of these powers is the number of decisions taken. 
Further, in order to be able to exercise its powers the NRA must be sufficiently resourced.  
(sub-objectives:  pro-activity of NRAs (powers of initiative), sufficient resources to enable it 
to act). 
 
 
2. Market entry 
 
Licensing 
- Proportionality (e.g. procedures should be not too cumbersome). Only conditions listed in 
the Directive. No onerous conditions imposed under the guise of conditions permitted under 
the Licensing Directive, relating e.g. to network configuration (number of interconnection 
points).  Fees should not deter market entry. 
- Individual licences only in limited cases + compliance with time limits + grounds given in 
case of refusal. 
- Publication of authorisation criteria giving the fullest possible information. 
                                                 
165 Communication from the Commission of 25 November 1998, Fourth Implementation Report, COM(1998) 
594, pp. 14-29. 
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- Only discrimination between different kinds of operator when justified by objective criteria. 
 
Numbering 
- Ensure the availability of adequate numbers and numbering ranges for all publicly available 
telecoms services. 
- Ensure that Numbering plans are under the control of the NRAs and that allocation is carried 
out in an objective, transparent, equitable, timely and non-discriminatory manner. 
 - Implementation of carrier selection, pre-selection with a call-by-call override facility and 
number portability 
 
Frequencies 
- Ensure full objectivity, transparency, and non-discrimination in the assignment of frequency 
ensured. 
- Ensure that the number of licences requiring the assignment of frequency may is limited 
only on the basis of essential requirements and only where related to the lack of frequency 
and justified under the principle of proportionality. 
 
Rights of way 
- No discrimination with regard to the granting of rights of way. 
- Where the granting of additional rights of way is not possible, Member States must ensure 
access to existing facilities at reasonable terms. 
 
 
3. Economic Regulation of market activities 
 
Interconnection / special access 
- Intervention NRA in case of delays in negotiation interconnection. 
- Publication of RIO + cost-orientation of interconnection charges of SMP operators. 
- Suitable accounting system and accounting separation must in place to ensure that these pricing 
obligations are observed. 
 
Tariffs / accounting systems 
- Phase out as rapidly as possible all unjustified restrictions on tariff re-balancing. 
- Ensure that Leased Lines tariffs are cost-oriented and transparent. 
- Ensure that that the cost accounting systems adopted by operators are implemented in a 
transparent way and show the main categories under which costs are grouped, together with 
the rules used for the allocation of costs, in particular with regard to the fair attribution of 
joint and common costs. 
- Legal separation in case of joint ownership of Cable and Telecoms networks. 
- Accounting separation where operators have special and exclusive rights for the provision of 
services in other sectors, and where SMP operators provide interconnection services to other 
organisations. 
 
Competition in the local loop 
- Ensure the availability of LLU and shared use. 
- Ensure publication RUO. 
- Ensure cost orientation. 
 
 
4. Social regulation of market activities 
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Universal service 
- Definition in each MS of the affordable conditions according to which the universal service, 
as defined, is being offered. 
- When the net cost of universal service obligations represents an unfair burden on the 
organisation providing universal service, and a financing scheme is set up ensure that it is 
based on objective, transparent, proportional and non-discriminatory and that the 
methodology of calculation of net cost sufficiently transparent. 
- Ensure that further public service requirements, imposed are not financed from mandatory 
contributions by market players. 
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ANNEX II: PROPOSED LIST OF INDICATORS UNDER 2003 FRAMEWORK 
 
 
A. INDUSTRY166 
 
- Evolution of penetration rates (broadband, mobile, fixed) 
- Evolution of retail prices 
- Financial health of incumbents and new entrants: profitability, evolution of shares prices 
- Wholesale price of main services (interconnection origination and termination, bitstream, 
shared access, full unbundling) 
- Investment of incumbents and new entrants: in infrastructure and in market development 
(customer acquisition, promotion new products) 
- Number of firms active on the market 
- Products offered by the firms 
 
 
B. REGULATION167 
 
1. Institutional issues 
 
- Independence of NRAs 
- Resources of NRAs 
- Powers of NRAs 
- Transparency of NRAs 
- Speed of process of NRAs 
- Effectiveness of NRAs decisions 
- Independence of appeal body 
- Speed of process of appeal body 
- Due process of appeal body 
- Effectiveness of sanctions and scale of resources of appeal body 
 
2. Market entry 
 
- General authorisation: conditions imposed, administrative charges 
- Rights of use of radio frequencies: attribution procedure, price, time, … 
- Rights of use of numbers 
- Rights of way 
 
3. Economic Regulation of market activities 
 
- Markets regulated 
- SMP operators 
- Remedies imposed (types of access, cost-orientation, ...) 
 
4. Social regulation of market operations 
                                                 
166 See also the indicators of the annual Communications Outlook of the OECD. 
167 Indicators were for example developed by Jones Day and SCP Network for the ECTA Regulatory scorecard 
2004, May 2004, available at: <http://www.ectaportal.com/regulatory/2004scorecard.zip>. 
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- Definition of universal service: content and price 
- Designation 
- Compensation and financing 
- Additional national service: definition and financing 
 
5. Compliance with European legislation 
 
- Infringement procedures commenced by the Commission,  
- Pending cases at the ECJ 
 
 
 
 
